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The South China Sea (in Chinese “Nanhai”) is a semi-enclosed sea that includes the 
Paracels (in Chinese Xisha) and Spratlys (in Chinese Nansha). Since the end of the Cold 
War, the attention of countries in Southeast Asia has gradually focused on the South 
China Sea conflict that is considered as a possible catalyst of regional unrest. 
Multilateralism has emerged as a good option for disputants to resolve the conflicts 
peacefully. Although the Chinese maintain a cautious stance towards multilateralism, a 
remarkable change of attitude took place in the 1990s. However, China’s unilateral 
moves in the early 1990s seemed to go against its embrace of multilateral cooperation 
with its Southeast Asian neighbors. The paper is trying to find out an answer to explain 
China’s controversial moves towards the multilateral functions. Considering the gap 
between existing academic works and reality, this author will apply the theory of 
hegemonic stability to explain China’s behavior. The hypothesis is intent to agree that 
China’s entry into multilateral cooperative mechanism is going to pursue hegemonic 
status in the region. The research design of this paper follows a way of qualitative 
analysis with the case study as the main methodology. The cases cover “Track I” ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and “Track II” Indonesian workshop on “Managing Potential 
Conflicts in the South China Sea” (MPCSCS), ranging from 1990 to 2001. The 
conclusion will shed light on the policy implications for the other disputants and also 
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1. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT 
 
The South China Sea (in Chinese Nanhai) is a semi-enclosed sea that includes the 
Paracels (in Chinese Xisha) and Spratlys (in Chinese Nansha). Before the 20th century, 
the South China Sea had not been considered as a dangerous zone and remained 
uninteresting to any claimant.1 During 1930s, France came to the region and claimed both 
the Paracels and the Spratlys. Then the ownership was handed over to Japan following 
France’s defeat in World War II. As a result, the South China Sea was included into 
Japanese administrative system. After the end of the war, Japan gave up its claims of the 
two archipelagoes and left the region unoccupied. Since then, the importance of the South 
China Sea has been gradually recognized by its neighboring states and a campaign for 
effective occupation over these islands has become a regional concern.  
 
The South China Sea conflicts are of concern to both claimants and non-claimants. What 
claimants mostly care about is the territorial issue of sovereignty.2 Reminded of the 
humiliation by the West, the claimants consider sovereignty as a sensitive and 
indisputable issue. From China’s perspective, the South China Sea is historically its.  
Bolstering its sovereignty claim and maintaining control over these territories are China’s 
main priorities compared to any other issues, including economic benefits. The other 
                                                 
1 Shee Poon Kim, “The South China Sea in China’s Strategic Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol.19, No.4 (March 1998), 370. 
2 It is defined by Odgaard as essential conflict, while the others are classified into non-essential conflicts. 
See Liselotte Odgaard, Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict and Cooperation in 
the Making of Regional Order (Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, c2002), 59. 
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claimants around the South China Sea were also very concerned the issue of sovereignty. 
Any loss of territory would be considered as the proof of Southeast Asian governments’ 
inability in defending their newly founded countries. As such, hardly any compromise 
could be reached among the claimants. Besides the issue of sovereignty, unclear 
quantities of energy resources and large amount of fish resources are increasingly 
becoming key issues among disputants. Firstly, oil has been largely considered as 
strategic resource. The Chinese Department of Geology and Mineral Resources estimated 
that the South China Sea may contain as much as 17.7 billion tons of oil, a figure 
questioned by Western oil experts.3 Despite the uncertainty, disputants still value the 
importance of the potential oil deposit therein. China also showed its eagerness to 
undertake oil explorations in this region,4 especially after it became a net importer of oil 
in 1993. Therefore, the competing claims to these archipelagoes took place among the 
South China Sea neighboring states in order to ensure that their oil exploitations were 
free from external intervention. Fishery dispute is another flashpoint among the regional 
concerns. It has a long history in Southeast Asia. Although the South China Sea area is 
productive in fishery resources, a warning of shortage has been recognized because the 
stocks are heavily fished by the states around.5  Since 1990, the stocks have been 
depleting at a quick pace mostly due to China’s growing consumption of seafood. The 
                                                 
3 For further readings about Chinese estimate, see Mark. J Valencia, “China and South China Sea Disputes: 
Claims and Potential Solutions in the South China Sea,” Adelphi paper 298, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1995). See also Summary of World Broadcast: Far East, September 5, 1994, No. 2094; Far 
Eastern Economic Review, June 1, 1995. For further readings about the argument from Western oil experts, 
see Craig Snyder, “The Implications of Hydrocarbon Development in the South China Sea,” International 
Journal, LII: 1, 144. 
4 Energy security is considered as the matter of life and death for China. See Ji Guoxing, “China versus 
South China Sea Security,” Security Dialogue, Vol.29, No.1 (January 1998), 105. 
5 John W. McManus, “The Spratly Islands: A Marine Park?” Ambio, Vol.23, No.3, (May 1994), 182; Trish 
Saywell, “Fishing for Trouble,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 13, 1997, 50-52. 
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deteriorating situation has urged the South China Sea littoral countries to work out 
effective solutions to ease the competing fishing claims. 
 
On the other hand, the non-claimants show great interest in preserving open navigation 
through the South China Sea region.6 It is mostly related to their economic benefits. 
Almost one-fourth of all the world’s trade passes through this region.7 In particular, oil 
shipping through the sea-lane from the Middle East to East Asia and North America 
grabs much attention from these outsiders, such as Japan and the United States. In terms 
of the South China Sea conflict, non-claimants prefer to resolve it peacefully without the 
use of force. However, what is unstated is their vested interest to prevent any claimant 
from controlling all the areas and ensure that the sea-lane open to all countries.8 
 
The disputes of the South China Sea mainly focus on the two archipelagoes, one of which 
is called the Paracels, located in the northwestern part. The Paracel Islands are claimed by 
China, alongside with Taiwan and Vietnam.9 All of the claims are based on a number of 
historical records. Chinese archaeologists have found some Chinese objects on the 
islands.10 These more than 2000-year old objects are considered as the evidence of 
China’s ownership of the territories since ancient times. A large amount of historical 
literatures have been presented by China to enhance its claim. Chinese experts have 
                                                 
6 Safety of navigation is also considered strategically important to the South China Sea littoral states. See 
Ali Alatas, “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea”, Indonesian Quarterly, Vol.18, No.2 
(April 1990), 114. 
7 Ross Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 
Vol.23, No.4 (Winter 1997), 196. 
8 For the UNITED STATES concern about the freedom of passage, see Shigeo Hiramatsu, “China’s 
Advances in the South China Sea: Strategies and Objectives,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.8, No.1 (2001), 45. 
9 Taiwan’s claims to Chinese ownership of the South China Sea are similar to those of the PRC. 
10 Chinese Central TV, Beijing, July 7, 1996; Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 30, 1997. 
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described the location of the South China Sea region quite earlier than their Southeast 
Asian disputants. Since the 19th and early 20th century, China has asserted claims to the 
Paracel Islands without effective occupation.11 In 1947, a map, produced by the Republic 
of China (the government of Chiang Kai-Shek), was also used by Mainland China as a 
historical document to claim all of the islands within the region. In 1992, China released 
the "Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones" Law which restates that both the Paracels and 
the Spratlys should be included in China’s claims in the region.12 Other than the verbal 
claims, China has also taken effective actions to occupy some of those islands. In 1974, 
China’s military forces attacked the Vietnamese forces and enforced its claim upon the 
western Paracels and later over the whole archipelago, ending Vietnam’s presence since 
1947. After the military occupation, China renamed the Paracel Islands as the Xisha 
Islands, and included them into the administrative control under its Hainan Island 
province. On the other hand, the Vietnamese also used historical evidence to support their 
sovereignty claims. Vietnam was colonized by France in the 19th century. The Paracel 
Islands, which were considered as Vietnam’s territory, were occupied by French. After 
World War II, France, on Vietnam’s behalf, came back to the South China Sea. It 
reiterated its presence on western Paracels left by the defeated Japan. Although the whole 
Paracel Islands were controlled by the Chinese after the Sino-Vietnam clash in 1974, 
Vietnam still maintained its territorial claims in this region. In spite of the existing 
disputes, China’s successful occupation has strengthened its military presence on the 
                                                 
11 Shigeo Hiramatsu, “China’s Advances in the South China Sea: Strategies and Objectives,” 41. 
12 BBC: Far East, February 28, 1992. 
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Paracel Islands and provided a springboard for China to encroach the territory in the 
Spratlys.13 
 
Another archipelago is the Spratlys that is made up of dozens of tiny islands and reefs. 
They are located in the southern part of the South China Sea with more than 700 nautical 
miles away from China’s Hainan Island. Compared to the Paracels, the Spratly dispute is 
more complicated because of its multinational nature. There are complex disagreements 
among several disputants. The Spratlys is claimed entirely by China, Vietnam and 
Taiwan but in part by Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. Indonesia does not claim any 
island in the Spratlys. However, the Natuna, which is thought as Indonesia’s “legal 
territory”, was also claimed by China when Chinese government published its map of the 
territory in 1995. Meanwhile, China and Taiwan maintained the same claims of the South 
China Sea territory. Among these disputants, both China and Vietnam substantiated their 
claims by using historical events, as happened during the disputes over the Paracel 
Islands. Different from these two countries, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
defended their claims in terms of international laws, in particular, the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS). Nevertheless, China and 
Vietnam also have found some clauses in 1982 UNCLOS, as well as international laws, 
that served their claims and have increasingly contested the other disputants’ arguments 
by applying the international law. 
 
                                                 
13 Frank Umbach, ASEAN and Major Power: Japan and China-A Changing Balance of Power? [cited June 
15, 2005], available form: http://www.weltpolitik.net/texte/asien/asean.pdf, 175. 
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All the disputants have sought to strengthen their claims by taking steps to demonstrate 
their sovereignty over the islands and the reefs. Till now, military forces of most 
claimants have occupied the scattered islets, cays and rocks of the archipelago, leaving 
Brunei as the only disputant not to have stationed its military on any island. Within the 
Spratly group, China occupies 9, including Mischief Reef. Taiwan occupies only the Itu 
Aba Island, which is the largest in the Spratlys. Vietnam occupies 25 of them while the 
Philippines 8 and Malaysia 3. Brunei only claims one feature, which is also contested by 
Malaysia, as being within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (See table 1). 
 
The conflicts between the disputants date back to 1970s. The Philippine’s defiance of 
Taiwan’s claim over the Itu Aba in 1971 arose from the scramble for effective occupation 
of the Spratlys. The 1970s is referred to as the golden period for disputants to occupy the 
Spratly Islands. The Philippines established its effective control over 5 features. Vietnam, 
just after its defeat by China’s troops on the Paracels in 1974, also began to annex the 
Spratly Islands actively and occupied 6 of the features. As the part of protest against the 
Philippines’ move in the early 1970s, China restated its claims over the whole area of this 
region. This archipelago is considered by China as an indisputable part of its territory 
since ancient time. However, compared with the other claimants, China was the last to 
carry out effective occupation of the Spratlys. Her occupation began in 1988 and started 
as an armed conflict between China and Vietnam. The Chinese sank two Vietnamese 
vessels, causing the loss of more than 70 lives. Finally, Chinese forces dislodged 
Vietnamese troops from a reef in the Spratly group. Because of its violent entrance into 
the disputes, China began to emerge as a security concern to regional states. In 1995, 
 7
China made a unilateral move to the Mischief Reef against the Philippines. It was also the 
first time China came into conflict with the country belonging to the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Stimulated further by the incident, the disputants 
realized the urgency to deal with an aggressive China and resolve the Spratly conflicts 
peacefully.  
 
Table 1: Spratly Features occupied and claimed by other states, 1999, estimate 
Occupant Feature occupied Also claimed by 
China  Ladder Reef Taiwan, Vietnam 
 Mischief Reef Taiwan, the Philippines 
 Subi Reef Taiwan, Vietnam, the 
Philippines 
 Graven Reef  
 Loai Ta South West Reef  
 Johnson South Reef  
 Kennan Reef  
 Cuarteron Reef  
 Fiery Cross Reef  
Taiwan Itu Aba Island China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines 
Vietnam Southwest Cay China, Taiwan, the 
Philippines 
 South Reef  
 Petley Reef  
 Sand Cay  
 Nam Yit Island  
 Discovery Great Reef  
 Central Reef  
 West Reef  
 East Reef  
 Pearson Reef  
 Alison Reef  
 Collins Reef  
 Sinh Ton Bong  
 Len Dao  
 Tennent Reef  
 Cornwallis South Reef  
 Sin Cowe Island  
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 Spratly Island China, Taiwan 
 Vanguard Reef  
 Prince Consort Bank  
 Grainger Reef  
 Prince of Wales Bank  
 Rifleman Bank  
 Amboyna Cay China, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Malaysia 
 Barque Canada Reef  
The Philippines Northeast Cay China, Taiwan, Vietnam 
 Thi Tu Island  
 West York Island  
 Lankiam Cay  
 Loaita Island  
 Nanshan Island  
 Flat Island  
 Commodore Reef China, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
Malaysia 
Malaysia Swallow Reef China, Taiwan, Vietnam 
 Ardasier and Dallas Reefs  




Source: Liselotte Odgaard, Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Making of Regional Order, 77-78. 
 
2. CHINA’S ENTRY INTO MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE 
MECHANISM 
 
With the end of the Cold War, Russia (the former Soviet Union) experienced a dramatic 
shrinking of its power. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia’s strategic importance to American 
national interests decreased. As a consequence, China emerged as a potential regional 
major power. Considering China’s military clashes in the South China Sea, Southeast 
Asian nations increasingly became worried about their “dragon neighbor”. Following the 
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international agreement on Cambodia in 1991, the attention of countries in Southeast 
Asia gradually became focused on the South China Sea conflict that was considered as a 
possible catalyst of regional unrest. How to engage China and prevent it from being a 
destabilizing factor became an urgent topic among Southeast Asian leaders. 
 
Multilateralism became a good option. According to Robert Keohane, multilateralism 
means “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states”.14 
While Ruggie states that it is “an institutional form which coordinates behavior among 
three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct—that is, principles 
which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the 
particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any 
specific occurrence”.15 Keohane’s definition is widely considered as a “nominal” or 
“quantitative” one because it only answers “what” multilateralism is. On the other hand, 
Ruggie’s definition explains “how” the multilateral mechanism processes and is 
perceived as more qualitative.16 
 
Multilateralism is increasingly welcomed by Asia-Pacific states, especially those in 
Southeast Asian region. The foundation of ASEAN was their first attempt to build such a 
                                                 
14 Robert Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal, Vol. 45, No.4 
(Autumn 1990), 73. 
15 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization, 
Vol.46, No.3 (Summer 1992), 566. 
16 For comprehensive explanations about the nuances between Keohane and Ruggie’s definitions of 
multilateralism, see Craig A. Snyder, “Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea,” 
Asian Perspective, Vol.21, No.1, (Spring-Summer), 8-9; Hongying Wang, “Multilateralism in Chinese 
Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization,” Asian Survey, Vol.40, No.3, 476-477; Nor Azmal Mohd. 
Nazir, “Multilateralism: ASEAN and Regional Conflict Management Process.” Paper presented at the 
International Workshop on New Dimensions of Conflict and Challenges for Conflict Management in 
Southeast Asia, December 5-9, 1999, Malaysia, 1-2. 
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kind of multilateral cooperative mechanism.17  The ASEAN Way is widely accepted by 
its members as the mechanisms for solving their conflicts. Although the ASEAN Way is 
not as effective as some optimists expect,18 ASEAN is still quite confident of solving the 
disputes multilaterally. Because of China’s unilateral moves into the South China Sea, it 
emerged as a major regional destabilizer. There was much debate on how to deal with an 
expanding China.19 Whether to engage, contain or resist China became an irresistible 
concern to both decision makers and overseas China experts. As a result of various 
exchanges, there was growing consensus within Southeast Asian leaders that 
accommodating China would serve their national interests.20 Southeast Asian states 
expected that they could encourage China to join the multilateral mechanism so as to 
solve the conflict peacefully. The reasons for this option are listed as follows: 1) Spratly 
Islands in the South China Sea are claimed by several countries. As it is a multilateral 
dispute, the South China Sea conflicts can not be resolved bilaterally;21 2) Concerning 
China’s growing influence in the South China Sea region, it would be unfairly 
                                                 
17 ASEAN was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Till 2004, 
the group has expanded to 10 members, including the new comers, namely Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam.  
18 See for example, David Martin Jones and Mike L Smith, “ The Strange Death of the ASEAN Way,” 
Australian Financial Review, April 12, 2002; Simon S. C. Tay and Jesus P. Estanislao, “ the Relevance of 
ASEAN Crisis and Change,” in Reinventing ASEAN, eds. Simon S. C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao, and Hadi 
Soesastro (Singapore : ISEAS, 2001), 3; Barry Wain, “ASEAN is Facing Its Keenest Challenges to Date,” 
Asian Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1998; Murray Hiebert, “Out of Its Depth,” Far Eastern Review,  
February 19, 1998, 26; Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security,” Pacific Affairs, 
Vol.71, No.2 (summer 1998), 195. 
19 See for example, Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China,” in East Asian Security, eds. 
Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 159-
187. 
20 For example, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng explained the importance to engage China 
firmly in the multilateral security dialogue. See Michael Leifer, “Will ASEAN Pay the Price for Peace?” 
The Business Times, (July 28, 1993). See also Ralf Emmers, “The Influence of the Balance of Power Factor 
within the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 23, No.2 (August 2001), 279. 
21 The Paracel Islands are mainly claimed by two countries, China and Vietnam. However, the territory is 
also claimed by a third party of Taiwan. Meanwhile, Vietnam is trying to internationalize the disputes and 
the resolution to the conflicts is widely concerned by the other ASEAN members.  As a result, the paper 
presumes that the Paracel conflict also has its multilateral elements. 
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advantageous for China to bilaterally deal with its Southeast Asian neighbors. 
Multilateralism provides a good option for individual nations to speak in one voice, in 
order to deny a potential hegemon the ability to assert its dominance; 3) Joining the 
multilateral mechanism could socialize China as a responsible power. The ASEAN Way, 
which calls for consultation and consensus, is also accepted by China. It would be helpful 
for China to engage multilateral forums and finally become an active supporter to 
peaceful resolutions of the South China Sea conflicts. 
 
As for the multilateralism in Chinese theory of international relations, Hongying Wang 
argues, “the Chinese understanding of nominal multilateralism is quite similar to that of 
the prevailing Western definition”, although differences do exist between the definitions 
of qualitative multilateralism. One of the major differences is that Chinese foreign policy 
does not permit interferences by outsiders, even multilateral international organizations 
or forums.22  
 
In reality, there is no concrete understanding of multilateralism among Chinese 
international relations scholars. Multilateralism was introduced to China in the 1980s. 
The theory of multilateralism is quite new to Chinese scholars. The research on 
multilateralism in China is still “near its starting point, far from maturity”.23 On the other 
hand, being a “Middle Kingdom” for a long time, China did not have much experience of 
                                                 
22 Hongying Wang, “Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization,” 479. 
23 Zhang Xinhua, “Chinese Literature on Multilateralism and the United Nations System,” in 
Multilateralism in Multilateral Perspective: Viewpoints from Different Languages and Literatures, ed. 
James P. Sewell (the United Nations University, 2000), 56; see also Rizal Sukma, “ASEAN and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum: Should “The Driver” be Replaced?” Indonesia Quarterly, Vol.27, No.3 (1999), 
239. 
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cooperating with the other countries. When the People’s Republic of China was founded, 
it remained as a weak power. “The New China” was eager to participate in international 
affairs but was afraid of being dominated by other powers. China felt more confident in 
coping with the conflicts bilaterally rather than multilaterally, because China was afraid 
of being taken advantage of by the partners in the multilateral frameworks.24 As a result, 
China only entered into the multilateral cooperative mechanisms that served its national 
interests, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization.25 Even when 
engaging in these mechanisms, China was always mindful of keeping its foreign policy 
independent. China’s behavior goes against the both nominal and qualitative definitions 
of multilateralism by Western international relations scholars. 
 
Although the Chinese maintain a cautious stance towards multilateralism, they have seen 
the potential benefits for participating in multilateral cooperation. This remarkable 
change of attitude took place in the 1990s. Premier Li Peng’s visit in Singapore in August 
1990 has indicated China’s willingness to seek a peaceful settlement multilaterally. 
During his trip, Li announced that China was prepared to set aside the territorial disputes 
in the South China Sea and pursue cooperation with the other claimants to explore the 
region collectively.26 Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated during his trip to 
Singapore in 1993 that, “as for security cooperation, in our view, we may start off with 
bilateral and regional security dialogues of various forms, at different levels and through 
                                                 
24 Yang Chengxu, “Dui dongya anquan wenti de fenxi,” (Analysis of East Asian Security), Guoji wenti 
yanjiu, No.3 (May 1994), 19-22. 
25 Just as what Long Yongtu had said, “when our country joins an international organization, our top 
priority remains our sovereignty and our national interest.” See Long Yongtu, “Jiaru shimaozuzhi, rongru 
guojishehui zhuliu,” (Joining the WTO, blending into the main stream of the international society), Guoji 
maoyi wenti (Issue of International Trade), No.9 (September 1999), 2-3.  
26 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, August 13, 1990, 36. 
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various channels in response to the diversity of the region. China will actively participate 
in these dialogues and consultations”.27 Almost at the same time, China’s officials and 
experts, who attended in a “private capacity”, began to talk with their Southeast Asian 
counterparts on the South China Sea issue at multilateral conferences and workshops. 
The most significant informal multilateral cooperative mechanism was the workshop 
entitled “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea” (MPCSCS) hosted by 
Indonesia.28 The workshop was financially supported by Canada and has met annually 
since 1990. The first meeting involved only ASEAN members. The main task was to 
discuss the sincerity of Li Peng’s proposal and work out the strategy towards China. 
Since the second workshop in 1991, China has attended the meetings actively (See table 
2). This unofficial, or second track, workshop was embraced by China because the 
working group was totally independent and did not support any particular jurisdictional 
claim in the disputed region.  
 
Table 2: Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, 1990-2001 
Meeting Dates Location China’s status 
First Workshop 1990/1/22-1/24 Bali, Indonesia N.A. 
Second Workshop 1991/7/15-7/18 Bandung, Indonesia Formal Member 
Third Workshop 1992/6/28-7/2 Yogyakarta, Indonesia Formal Member 
Fourth Workshop 1993/8/23-8/25 Surabaya, Indonesia Formal Member 
Fifth Workshop 1994/10/26-10/28 Bukittinggi, Indonesia Formal Member 
Sixth Workshop 1995/10/09-10/13 Balikpapan, Indonesia Formal Member 
Seventh Workshop 1996/12/14-12/17 Batam, Indonesia Formal Member 
Eighth Workshop 1997/12/2-12/6 Puncak, Indonesia Formal Member 
Ninth Workshop 1998/12/1-12/3 Jakarta, Indonesia Formal Member 
Tenth Workshop 1999/12/6-12/8 Bogor, West Java, Formal Member 
                                                 
27 “China Ready to Take Part in Asian Security Dialogue”, excerpts from speech by Vice-Premier and 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the Foreign Correspondents’ Association in Singapore, July 24, 1993, 
Beijing Review, August 9-15, 1993. 
28 See Lee Lai To, China and the South China Sea dialogues (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). The book 
offers a useful review of China’s engagement of both informal and formal multilateral dialogues. 
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Indonesia 
Eleventh Workshop 2001/3 Jakarta, Indonesia Formal Member 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
The first chance China talked with its Southeast Asian neighbors in a regional formal 
multilateral setup was in 1991. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was invited by 
ASEAN counterparts to attend the 24th Asian Ministerial Meeting (AMM) as a guest. As 
it was the debut for China on formal Sino-ASEAN multilateral stage, ASEAN was afraid 
of discouraging China’s participation in the dialogue by talking about some sensitive 
issues. As a result, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea were not raised during 
the meeting. Meanwhile, China did not want the territorial disputes to be 
internationalized and was quite satisfied with ASEAN’s such arrangement. However, at 
the 25th AMM in 1992, Vietnam, as an observer, initiated the proposal to talk about the 
South China Sea issue. As a response, China reiterated its stance and kept the disputes 
silent in such a formal multilateral dialogue.  
 
The 1995 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) allowed the South China Sea disputes to be 
discussed for the first time at the highest-ranking formal multilateral mechanism in the 
region (See table 3). The first ARF meeting took place in Thailand, 25 July 1994. China 
then was a consultative partner. The ARF was a consultative body established on the 
initiative of the ASEAN states. The South China Sea conflict was one of the three key 
issues that were raised at that meeting. After the Mischief Reef incident in 1995, China 
made a move to talk about the territorial disputes during the meeting in Brunei. As Qian 
Qichen stated when he arrived in Brunei, “China was ready to work with the countries 
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concerned to settle the relevant disputes appropriately through peaceful negotiations 
according to recognized international law and the contemporary law of the sea, including 
the basic principles and legal regimes defined in the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea”.29 From the 1995 session onward, the South China Sea discussion became part of 
agenda at annual meetings.  
 
Table 3: ASEAN Regional Forum, 1994-2001 
 
Meeting Dates Locations China’s status 
First Forum 1994/7/25 Bangkok, Thailand Consultative Partner 
Second Forum 1995/8/1 Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei 
Darussalam 
Consultative Partner 
Third Forum 1996/7/23 Jakarta, Indonesia Dialogue Partner 
Fourth Forum 1997/7/27 Subang Jaya, Malaysia Dialogue Partner 
Fifth Forum 1998/7/27 Manila, Philippines Dialogue Partner 
Sixth Forum 1999/7/26 Singapore Dialogue Partner 
Seventh Forum 2000/7/27 Bangkok, Thailand Dialogue Partner 
Eighth Forum 2001/7/25 Ha Noi, Viet Nam Dialogue Partner 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
However, China’s unilateral moves in the 1990s seemed to go against its embrace of 
multilateral cooperation with its Southeast Asian neighbors. On 25 February 1992, China 
passed the "Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones" Law, laying claims to all of the South 
China Sea Islands. Later that year, China National Offshore Oil Corporation signed a 
joint exploration contract with a U.S. company, namely Crestone Energy Corporation, to 
explore oil in the disputed waters unilaterally, although the contract was opposed by 
Vietnam. China was also prepared to send naval troops to safeguard the company. In 
                                                 
29 ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-Eight ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Post Ministerial Conferences and 
Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1995), 66. 
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February 1995, China occupied the Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines, in the 
Spratly Islands, and then went on to establish military facilities at the end of 1998.  
 
Beijing’s unilateral actions were adverse to any notion of multilateral cooperation. Many 
states began to doubt China’s sincere commitment to renounce the use of force and settle 
the disputes multilaterally. Even from China’s perspective, although it agreed to join the 
multilateral dialogue, it still highlighted the importance of bilateral forums to resolve the 
territorial disputes. Thus, how to explain China’s entry into multilateral cooperative 
mechanism has emerged as an interesting question for the students of international 
relations in East Asia. The study will try to explain China’s controversial involvement in 
the multilateral setups. 
 
The next chapter undertakes broad literature review with regard to China’s entry into 
multilateral cooperative mechanism in the South China Sea. Considering the gap between 
existing academic work and reality, I would like to apply the neorealist theory of 
hegemonic stability, which is persuasive in explaining China’s worldview and strategy, in 
the second chapter. Based on neorealism, my hypothesis argues that China’s entry into 
multilateral cooperative mechanism is to pursue hegemonic status in the region. The 
chapter will test whether it is feasible to apply the neorealist theory of hegemonic 
stability to explain the South China Sea realities. In the third and fourth chapters, two 
cases would be explored to analyze China’s pursuance of hegemonic status in the region. 
The research design of this paper follows a way of qualitative analysis with the case 
study as the main methodology. The cases cover “Track I” (ARF) and “Track II” 
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(MPCSCS) multilateral frameworks, 30 ranging from 1990 to 2001.31 The last chapter 

















                                                 
30 It does not imply that the South China Sea disputes are discussed only within the MPCSCS and ARF. 
Multilateral functions that touch this issue also include the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific (CSCAP), the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of ASEAN-China, Japan, South Korea (10+3), the 
Foreign Ministers' Meeting of Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC) with ASEAN dialogue partners, and 
ASEAN-China Dialogue Meeting (10+1). 
31 Since the terrorist attack in 11th September 2001, terrorism drew back the US attention to the Southeast 
Asia. The US became more active in safeguarding the maritime security in the South China Sea. Then the 
conflicts in this region became more complicated and unpredictable. As a result, this author just checks the 
two cases until 2001. For the argument of Sino-ASEAN relations after the terrorist attack, see Alice D. Ba, 
“China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol.43, No.4 (2003), 
644. 
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Though China’s engagement into multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea 
disputes has surfaced in writings on conflict resolutions in this region by different 
scholars, so far very few attempts have been made to explain the reasons for China’s 
changing attitude toward multilateralism. The existing debates mainly follow three lines 
of arguments. The three grand systemic theories include realism, liberalism and 
constructivism. Departing from the each of these theories, observers would view China’s 
South China Sea policy from a distinctive perspective respectively. 
 
       1.1   REALISM 
 
Realism has dominated the study of international relations over the past fifty years. It has 
been widely considered persuadable by international relations students to interpret 
China’s behavior on the South China Sea conflicts. According to realist theory, states are 
the key actors in world politics. States are operating in an anarchic system because no 
higher government sits above them. Staying in such a self-help system, a state has to 
protect itself from being controlled by foreigners, including other states and international 
institutions. As a result, states seldom commit sincerely to the principles or sacrifice their 
authority to the organizations. Rational states only view international organization or 
multilateral entity as an instrument to pursue their national interests. Although most 
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international law or rule is obeyed, it would be verified or broken by strong states at any 
time they like.32 
 
Rooted in realist theory, Yong Deng insisted that the conception of national interests 
played a predominant role in China’s foreign policy. And realpolitik thinking was much 
more popular than liberal values within both Chinese officials and international relations 
scholars. Pushed by the realist thinking, China’s decision makers paid attention mainly on 
how they could take advantage of the transnational and multilateral networks to protect 
and maximize China’s national interests. Meanwhile, in the face of the pressure from 
regional security multilateralism in the 1990s, China was compelled to adopt a low-key 
posture in the changing international environment. 33  
 
Yong Deng’s argument is persuasive. He provided a broad view of China’s attitude 
towards regional multilateralism. However, he did not go further to explain the specific 
cases. His argument is still waiting to be tested on whether it can be applied to interpret 
China’s engagement in multilateral frameworks for the South China Sea conflict 
resolutions. Meanwhile, the extent of foreign pressure’s influence on China’s attitude 
towards multilateralism also needs further explanation. Did it cause a greater liberal 
influence within China’s think-tank, or a more defensive stance of China’s realist 
decision-makers? 
 
                                                 
32 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol.25, No.1 
(Summer 1997), 27. 
33 Yong Deng, “The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations,” The China 
Quarterly, No.154 (June 1998), 308-329. 
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The question above was answered by Lee Lai To. According to Lee’s argument, China 
was compelled to touch the Spratly issue in the formal ARF whether it liked it or not.34 
Tobias Ingo Nischalke also said that China had been affected by ASEAN and had to 
make concessions although it still rejected multilateralism and internationalization of the 
South China Sea disputes.35 
 
Swaine and Tellis’ explanation was situated in the power transition theory that expected 
that China, as a rising power, would be unsatisfied with the status quo and was going to 
behave assertively. They examined China’s grand strategy from historical and conceptual 
perspectives. They concluded that the “calculative” strategy was preferable to China’s 
interests and had been used by China in recent decades. When explaining China’s 
embrace of a multilateral framework, the authors agreed that the territorial claims of the 
South China Sea were significant to China’s interest. However, it could not be resolved in 
the near future. As a result, China’s strategy was to postpone the issue until the 
opportunity was to China’s advantage. What could be expected was that “Beijing would 
seek sinocentric solutions to this territorial dispute”.36 Thus, the reason for China to 
participate in the multilateral security framework was that “Beijing realized that its lack 
of participation could result in these institutions adopting policies that might not be in 
China’s best interests”.37  
 
                                                 
34 Lee Lai To: China and the South China Sea dialogues (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1999), 43. 
35 Tobias Ingo Nischalke, “Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-operation: The “ASEAN Way”, a 
Real Spirit or a Phantom?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.22, No.1 (April 2000), 100. 
36 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), 201. 
37 Ibid, 136. 
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Avery Goldstein’s argument is similar to Swaine and Tellis’. He tried to explore the 
hidden intentions of China’s international behavior from its grand strategy as well. But 
his understanding of grand strategy was different from the previous two researchers’. 
Goldstein viewed China’s contemporary grand strategy as seeking to “engineer the 
country’s rise to the status of a true great power…that shapes the international system.”38 
Thus, China’s warmer embrace of multilateralism was to serve its great power diplomacy. 
That is, to be involved in regional and global matters, to reassure the other disputants and 
to enhance China’s reputation as a responsible actor. Another reason was that bilateralism 
cannot provide the expected leverage when the South China Sea conflicts were 
intensified and China had no better choice but to participate in the multilateral framework 
organized by the united regional actors. He explained further in his later paper that the 
reason for China’s interest in multilateral framework was to “buy the time it will take to 
develop a power projection capability that can serve as a coercive hedge against the 
failure of diplomacy.”39 
 
Rooted in structural realism, Goldstein and the other researchers’ arguments provided 
reasonable explanations for China’s foreign policy. It seemed persuasive, especially when 
it was applied to explain that China wanted to shape the regional order by using 
multilateralism as a tool. However, it is hard to say whether China’s embrace of 
multilateralism is a defensive option or not. According to the scholars, China’s move to 
the multilateral forum was considered as a defensive action. “Its initial participation was 
                                                 
38 Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomacy Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging 
Choice,” China Quarterly (2001), 836. 
39 Avery Goldstein, “Structural Realism and China's Foreign Policy: Much (But Never All) of the Story,” 
in Perspectives on structural realism ed. Andrew K. Hanami (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
142. 
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the result of a constrained choice”.40 Holding a different opinion, I propose that China’s 
engagement is an offensive move. When the conflict is intensified, it does not necessarily 
mean that the Southeast Asian countries would unite together against China. For example, 
it was hard for them to make a concerted stand after the Mischief Reef incident in 1995. 
China did not feel pressured and it was not forced to respond to international environment. 
As a regional power, China can decide not to be involved in the multilateral frameworks 
until it is well prepared. When China attends multilateral talks, it would bring its own 
ideas as well. What China wants to do in the meeting is to play power politics in order to 
rewrite or revise the rules to China’s advantage. Then the rules could be used as an 
effective tool for China to solve the South China Sea conflicts, regarding the current 
irresolvable conditions.  
 
Michael Yahuda, another realist, went further to explain China’s movement to the 
multilateral frameworks. His paper provides an overview of China’s engagement with 
international community during the last 50 years and evaluates China’s current 
international standing and her conduct of foreign affairs. As Yahuda said, China had 
realized that it could not take advantage of the multilateral institutions unilaterally 
without fulfilling its own duty within the groups, especially in the 1990s. Thus, China 
showed its eagerness to be the part of multilateral mechanism, even within the ARF that 
was concerned with security issues. However, China’s intention was to promote “its own 
ideas for international norms and regimes”.41 That is the reason why China agreed to talk 
                                                 
40 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, 
136. 
41 Michael Yahuda, “China’s Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain,” China Quarterly, 
No.159 (1999), 653. 
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about the Spratly conflicts multilaterally but “little direct progress has been registered so 
far”.42 
 
Yahuda’s argument is similar to my hypothesis. However, he was uncertain about the 
depth of China’s commitment to the internationalist approach. His doubts were due to the 
reason that “China is still ruled by a communist party”.43 Nevertheless, communist 
ideology did not play such an important role in deciding China’s foreign policy in the 
1990s.44 Thanks to China’s “open-up” policy, market-orientated economy has been 
introduced to China. Learning from Western experience, China has become quite familiar 
with the capitalist world. Meanwhile, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, China 
realized the necessity of economic reforms and engagement in the world community. 
Communist ideology would have to become secondary to national interest. The ideology 
is in the process of being purged from China’s foreign policy. In light of the above 
arguments, it is easy to realize that the very determinant of foreign policy should be 
national interest, a concern that is taken into account all the time, even during the Cold 
War. In accordance to national interests, China’s commitment to a multilateral approach 
is foreseeable. That is why my hypothesis will go further than Yahuda’s argument. 
 
Unlike the mainstream arguments, Eric Hyer tried to explain China’s behaviors in the 
South China Sea disputes by applying a two-track “hard/soft” policy. 45 The method was 
                                                 
42 Ibid, 654. 
43 Ibid. 
44 This is the essence of a secret “red-heading” document issued by Beijing. See the Chao-Liu (Currents) 
Monthly, Hong Kong, November 1991. 
45 Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China’s Earlier Territorial Settlements,”  
Pacific Affairs, Vol.68, No.1 (Spring 1995), 34-54. 
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to analyze China’s pattern of earlier territorial settlements. Following the same tack taken 
in the disputes of early period (1960s-1990) and disputes with Japan over the Senkaku 
Islands (Diaoyu Dao), China’s strategy could be interpreted into two-track “hard/soft” 
policy. The policy implied that China considered its territorial claims as non-negotiable 
issues, even at the expense of military clashes. However, as strategic considerations 
changed, China was willing to compromise and seek peaceful settlements. In line with 
this logic, just after China’s military expansion in the Spratlys in 1988, “Beijing quickly 
moved to ensure its active participation in the discussions among concerned parties to 
prevent the conflict from hampering developing relations with the ASEAN states”.46 
Then China’s welcome of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea in 1990 was considered as a change from its earlier “hard” approach to a later 
“soft” approach. According to the author, if the “hard/soft” approach was adopted in this 
dispute, “Beijing’s future behavior is predictable”.47 
 
Hyer’s “hard/soft” policy is derived from the examination of China’s earlier territorial 
settlements. His assumption is that both the shift of balance of power since the end of the 
Cold War and China’s military superiority in this region do not necessarily indicate a 
change of China’s strategy. Here, his assumption should be contested. China’s two-track 
policy was mainly determined by the Cold War and the Indochina conflict. Since the end 
of the Cold War, the balance of power in this region has been changed following the 
withdrawal of the U.S. and Russian influences. This would make it easier for China to 
deal with the disputants in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries have 
                                                 
46 Ibid, 51. 
47 Ibid, 53. 
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been feeling the pressure from this giant neighbor. As a result, it is hard to say whether 
China’s South China Sea policy shares the same tack with its early territorial settlement. 
The two-track policy may, but not necessarily, explain China’s entry into multilateral 
mechanisms. 
  
Hyer’s “hard/soft”-policy argument was shared by Ross Marlay. An analysis of the 
Mischief Reef incident and China’s behavior aftermath was included in Marlay’s 
research to test China’s two-track policy. Meanwhile, Marlay added that “China’s 
diplomacy towards Southeast Asia seems unpredictable and erratic…claims are turned on 
and off at will”.48 The reason for China to discuss the South China Sea disputes 
multilaterally after the Mischief occupation was to make a concession in order to calm 
down the Southeast Asian disputants. 
 
However, China’s South China Sea policy is not as fluid as Marlay maintained. Holding a 
worldview of realpolitik, China was considered as a rational actor. China’s relationship 
with the Southeast Asian nations played a great part in its global ambitions. China’s 
avocation of “shelve disputes while, conducting joint development”, its unilateral actions 
to the Mischief Reef, embrace of the informal multilateral workshop and later formal 
forum, could not be considered erratic. All the moves have been carefully calculated in 
order to serve China’s long-term strategy. “Hard/soft” policy just leaves us a superficial 
view of China’s policy towards the South China Sea disputes. That would be easy to give 
observers a sense that China’s behavior is unpredictable. In reality, China’s real intention 
                                                 
48 Ross Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands”, 199. 
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is to build up hegemonic stability by using multilateral tools in the region. Considering 
this strategy, China’s move in the region is foreseeable.  
 
Similar to the “hard/soft” policy, Quan Sheng Zhao tried to classify China’s foreign 
policy into two forms that were characterized as negotiable and non-negotiable. He 
provided an overview of China’s foreign-policy behavior patterns. He agreed that China’s 
foreign-policy behavior was a combination of flexibility and rigidity. The two characters 
originated from the two categories of principles that are essential and rhetorical 
respectively. If the issue was “China’s vital and enduring national interests”,49 taking 
sovereignty as an example, it was non-negotiable and considered as an essential affair. If 
the issue was “highly sensitive but less substantial”,50 it could be negotiated and called a 
rhetorical affair. Thanks to the changing of domestic conditions and international 
environment, “nonnegotiable principles may be converted to negotiable principles 
through the use of unofficial arrangements or informal channels”.51 However, 
nonnegotiable issues, such as the South China Sea conflict, could lead to international 
conflicts as well for the reason of nationalism. 
 
The argument reflects the dominance of realist thinking in China’s foreign-policy making 
process. The two-principle pattern helps China secure as much advantage as it can. 
However, the pattern cannot explain the China’s policy towards the South China Sea 
conflict clearly and even self-conflicting at times. Territorial dispute in this region is 
                                                 
49 QuanSheng Zhao, “Patterns and Choices of Chinese Foreign Policy,” Asian Affairs An American Review, 
Vol.20, No.1 (Spring 1993), 4. 
50 Ibid, 4. 
51 Ibid. 
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considered essential. On the other hand, China has been more active in participating both 
informal and formal mechanisms to solve the conflicts. Does it mean that the 
nonnegotiable issue has already been changed to a negotiable one? If yes, then we can 
anticipate the peaceful resolution. Yet, the Mischief Reef incident is more likely to give 
us the alternative answer that is no. According to the author’s logic, nationalism plays 
more important role in the South China Sea issue. The nationalism leads to a rigid 
character of China’s foreign policy. However, it cannot explain China’s more flexible 
engagement into multilateralism with its Southeast Asian counterparts on the South 
China Sea conflict. The explanation makes the readers confused and the argument of 
China’s foreign-policy pattern cannot be applied to interpret China’s moves on this issue. 
 
       1.2   LIBERALISM 
 
The primary alternative international relations theory is liberalism, which questions most 
of realism’s basic assumptions. Since the end of the Cold War, realism has been widely 
viewed as obsolete.52 To many, Liberalism seems to give a more persuasive explanation 
of world realities. Liberalists stress that although states may be rational and self-
interested, disputes between them can be prevented if the states really want to avoid it. 
For them, war is not the major topic of the international arena any longer. Instead, 
international trade is increasing in importance within the state interactions. Peace and 
development have become the primary features of international relations. 
 
                                                 
52 For example, Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War and the Failure of 
Realism,” International Organization, Vol.48, No.2 (Spring 1994), 249-277. 
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One major camp of liberalism is interdependence theory. Liberals argue that economic 
interdependence lowers the likelihood of war.53 As the participants can get benefits 
through cooperation, international trade inevitably causes the dependence of states on one 
another. Then any assertive actions would be constrained by fear of damaging economic 
interdependence. 
 
Starting from interdependence theory, Hongying Wang provided us with a broad 
overview of the development of multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy. Although she 
did not explain the reason for China’s changing attitude towards multilateralism clearly, 
she tried to give us another explanation. She argued, “China’s positive attitude toward 
multilateralism may have less to do with changes in its preferences through learning and 
socialization than with the structural changes in the world”.54 Interdependence around the 
world has been widely considered as the trend for the international relations. This 
changing structure caused China to seek multilateral cooperation to gain national power 
and glory. 
 
Shee Poon Kim provided a more specific explanation. He incorporated the South China 
Sea conflicts with the analysis of China’s strategic thinking. His argument was that 
China’s multilateral diplomacy in this region was driven by the motive to establish or 
improve relations with neighboring states. According to the author, China’s strategic 
behavior was largely affected by its strategic thinking, especially Deng Xiaoping’s eight 
                                                 
53 See for example, Richard Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (London: T. Fischer Unwin, 
1903), 225. 
54 Hongying Wang, “Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization,” Asian Survey, 
Vol.40, No.3 (May/June 2000), 490. 
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strategic principles. The most influential principle is the theme of “peace and 
development”. Thus, the most important priority in China’s foreign policy objectives in 
the South China Sea issue was to “ensure a stable external environment conducive to 
China’s economic modernization and growth”.55 That was the reason why China 
restrained its behavior in face of the other South China Sea disputants and advocated 
shelving the sovereignty disputes while promoting joint development. 
 
Similarly, both Tim Huxley and Rupert Hodder insisted that China’s international 
policies were conservative and constructive.56 The primary concern of China was to keep 
the regional stability in order to promote international trade and inflow of foreign capital 
and technology. China had been quite conservative in the South China Sea conflict, 
seeking opportunities for cooperation with the other disputants in order to consolidate 
existing relationships. Multilateralism worked as a possible channel for communication. 
 
The arguments above are reasonable when they are applied by the authors to explain 
China’s benign action that is to keep the tensions at a low level and place more 
importance on economic relations. However, they cannot explain the outbreak of the 
Mischief Reef incident.  In China’s strategic thinking, territory and sovereignty cannot be 
overridden by the other concerns, even economic benefits, in the foreseeable future. It 
seems that China has been prepared to risk its relationship with Southeast Asian nations 
when it plans to occupy the disputed islands. Meanwhile, according to Gerald Segal, the 
                                                 
55 Shee Poon Kim, “The South China Sea in China’s Strategic Thinking,” 378. 
56 Tim Huxley, “A Threat in the South China Sea? A Rejoinder,” Security Dialogue, Vol.29, No.1 (1998), 
116-117; Rupert Hodder, “China and the World: Perception and Analysis,” Pacific Review, Vol.12, No.1 
(1999), 72. 
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disruption of trade relations with Southeast Asia does not mean so much to China’s 
economic development.57 In struggling for independence in foreign policy, China fights 
to reject any constraint of economic interdependence that would cause China to 
excessively depend on others. When China faces the decrease of foreign trade, it could 
expand internal demands for sustaining its economic development. As a result, relations 
between China’s concern of interdependence and its behavior on the South China Sea 
conflict should be questioned. 
 
Another camp departing from liberalism is liberal institutionalism. The theory challenges 
realism’s concept of anarchy and insists that state is not the only actor in international 
relations. International institutions and regimes can shape and limit state behavior. To be 
part of an international community, the state has to abide by the moral and legal 
principles within the system. Otherwise, the political and economic costs of violating the 
norms could be high. 
 
Rosemary Foot explored “the basis for China’s now more positive appraisal of the 
ARF”.58 Her explanation is shared by other analysts of international organizations. From 
her point of view, the main reason was the transformatory effects of the multilateral 
mechanism. The regular participation helps the members to develop a sense of 
interdependence. The participants are encouraged to set and later abide by the norms and 
rules within the body. China had been increasingly satisfied with the ARF structure and 
                                                 
57 Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China”, 175. 
58 Rosemary Foot, “China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes 
of Thought,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVIII, No.5 (May 1998), 426-427. 
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approach to security questions during its participation.59 China’s domestic bureaucracies 
and research institutes became more likely to embrace the idea of multilateralism and 
began to enjoy the existence in the multilateral organizations. China had also publicly 
accepted that resolving “overlapping claims over islands in the South China Sea would 
have been unlikely in the absence of the ARF”.60 All these imply that China is on its way 
of being socialized. China can be counseled to be a self-restraining and responsible power, 
and able to lead a peaceful settlement of the South China Sea conflict in the end. Craig A. 
Snyder has a similar view arguing, “The evolutionary nature of cooperative security 
approaches offers an opportunity to convince the Chinese of the benefits of participating 
in multilateral institutions”.61 Snyder stressed that although China’s move to regional 
multilateralism was largely affected by Sino-U.S. relations at that time, the benefits of 
being involved in the multilateral institutions did help China to allow the inclusion of the 
Spratly disputes at the ARF meetings. 
 
Liberal institutional arguments are easy to be challenged when we consider China’s hard 
realpolitik worldview.62 China’s military presence in the Mischief Reef causes doubt of 
China’s embrace of multilateral cooperation. For China, the issue of sovereignty is non-
                                                 
59 Except for China’s satisfaction with the multilateralism, Jusuf Wanadi adds that a peaceful surrounding 
for China’s modernization is another important reason for China to embrace multilateralism. See Jusuf 
Wanadi, “The Rise of China: A Challenge for East Asia,” Indonesian Quarterly, Vol.XXX, No.3 (2002), 
227-228; See also Niklas Swanström, Conflict Management and Negotiations in the South China Sea: The 
ASEAN Way? [cited 3 May 2005], available from: www.sum.uio.no/southchinasea/Publications/pdf-
format/Swanstrom.pdf 
60 Rosemary Foot, “China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes 
of Thought”, 439. 
61 Craig A. Snyder: “Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea,” Asian Perspective, 
Vol.21, No.1 (Spring-Summer 1997), 6. 
62 Even in the period of the 1980s and 1990s, “hard realpolitik decision rules continue to dominate the 
Chinese leadership’s approach to foreign policy and security affairs.” See Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural 
Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 217. 
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negotiable and China has never given up its claims of the whole South China Sea area. It 
indicates that the security issue can only be touched in favor of China’s interests within 
the multilateral frameworks. According to China’s logic, the cost of breaking the rules 
cannot be higher than that of the territorial loss. Meanwhile, the multilateral framework 
involving the South China Sea dispute is still at its early stage. The laws and rules will 
not have any decisive influence on the members’ behaviors. If the regulations cannot 
meet China’s interest, military force remains as the final arbiter of China’s foreign policy. 
As a result, what can be expected is that China will not be constrained by the mechanism. 
Instead, China is going to dominate the multilateral talks by using power politics to shape 
its future direction. 
 
        1.3   CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
Apart from the realism and liberalism, constructivism provides us with an alternative 
point of view towards China’s engagement in regional multilateral mechanisms. In 
contrast to realism and liberalism, which emphasize on overwhelming effect of material 
conditions on states’ identities and interests, constructivism stresses the importance of 
intersubjective factors.63 Interstate identity-formation originated primarily from the 
interactions between them. 
 
Martin Stuart-Fox is a representative of few researchers who explained China’s 
multilateral move to the South China Sea conflict by applying constructivism. He 
                                                 
63 Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International 
Organization, No.41 (Summer 1987), 358-359. 
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borrowed the concept of history and culture to understand China-Southeast Asia relations. 
For more than two thousand years, China and Southeast Asian countries had learned how 
to deal with each other. All the actors had been cultivated to engage into the “tributary 
system”. The history and culture could shed light on contemporary relations between 
them. China, as a previous “Middle Kingdom”, hoped to resume its dominant influence. 
Disrupted by the century of humiliation, China developed a “calculative strategy” to 
regain its power. The reason for China to begin dealing with its Southeast Asian 
counterparts on a multilateral platform was that “China has shown itself prepared to act 
as a good international team player”.64 That would be helpful to preserve an amicable 
international environment for China’s development. However, Martin also argued that 
multilateralism did not mean much to China-Southeast Asia relations due to history and 
culture. China had been used to dealing with its smaller neighbors bilaterally. Meanwhile, 
its Southeast Asian disputants could not join a group against China when China annexed 
the South China Sea territory. According to Martin’s argument, China considered 
multilateralism as a tool to rebuild intersubjective identity rather than a direct measure to 
resolve the South China Sea conflict. 
 
Although history and culture had a great influence on the contemporary pattern of 
relations between China and Southeast Asia, it does not necessarily mean that each actor 
would follow the same track to deal with each other. The international structure for the 
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current China is different from that for the ancient China.65 China has been skillful at 
playing power politics on world affairs. For the domination of realpolitik in China’s 
foreign policy making process, the consideration of history and culture influence would 
remain secondary.  
 
Taking into account all the literatures discussed above, it is easy to reach the conclusion 
that liberalism and constructivism are more persuasive to explain China’s benign 
behavior. Otherwise, realism is more reasonable to interpret China’s assertive actions.  
 
According to Ji Guoxing, these two divergent explanations are considered as the two 
parts of China’s policy toward the South China Sea disputes. Ji maintained that the “two 
component parts are contradictory, but coexist in a single entity”.66 To behave as a good 
neighbor played a determinant role in China’s South China Sea policy. As a result, China 
adopted a conciliatory and flexible attitude in the Spratly disputes and embraced 
multilateral meetings for conflict resolutions. 
 
Unlike Ji’s assessment, Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya provided an analysis of the 
power, interest and legitimation that would influence China’s engagement in multilateral 
frameworks. Structural realism helps us to understand why China was reluctant to talk 
about the South China Sea conflict prior to the inaugural ARF meeting in 1994. Although 
China agreed to talk about the issue in the later meetings, it was still constrained when 
                                                 
65 He argued that ancient Chinese sense of national security could never prevail again in current China. See 
Denny Roy, “The Foreign Policy of Great-Power China.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.19, No.2 
(September 1997), 128. 
66 Ji Guoxing, “China versus South China Sea Security”, 101. 
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national interests and objectives came into conflict with multilateralist goals.67 China’s 
changing attitude toward regional multilateralism can be explained by applying neo-
liberal thinking of hegemonic stability theory. The key reason for China, as a hegemonic 
power, to pursue multilateral cooperation is legitimacy. China’s embrace of 
multilateralism may due to its “ideational transitions and identity formation”.68 Beijing 
began to realize that ARF could serve as a stage for airing its own security perceptions. 
With the help of the ARF, China could build up its image as a responsible regional power. 
Meanwhile, ASEAN’s position in the ARF had reassured China and made China less 
anxious within the multilateral talks on sensitive issues. 
 
However, the realities show that there was little change of China’s perceptions towards 
power and legitimacy. After the Mischief Reef occupation in 1995, China fortified its 
presence on the island in 1998. In light of China’s unilateral moves, it could be easy to 
find that structural realism still played a dominant role in China’s worldview. According 
to the liberal thinking of hegemonic stability theory, China would act as a benign 
hegemon in order to pursue multilateral cooperation. However, how can a benign 
hegemon retain an option of claiming the disputed territory militarily? As a result, the 
ideational transition, which is expected by the two authors, cannot provide a persuasive 
answer to China’s policy change. 
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Brantly Womack questioned the utility of the two dominant approaches, namely 
structural realism and economic interdependence. Instead, the author applied the theory 
of asymmetry to analyze the role of leadership in China’s relations with Southeast Asian 
nations. According to the logic of this theory, China had a particular responsibility for 
regional leadership, compared with its Southeast Asian counterparts. To act as a leader, 
China had decided to enmesh into the regional multilateral frameworks and this 
“involved a sacrifice of potential leverage against individual states in favor of a stable 
regional relationship.”69 The efforts included China’s more cooperative stance on South 
China Sea conflict. As a result, the multilateral dispute over this region was then “fairly 
well buffered against crises.”70  
 
From the author’s point of view, China was building up its reputation as a benign 
regional leader. This sounds reasonable if we ignore China’s military modernization and 
its unilateral moves in the Mischief Reef in 1995. As China never renounced its claims of 
territory in the South China Sea, it is difficult to say whether Southeast Asian disputants’ 
autonomy can be acknowledged unless they give up their territorial claims. Until then we 
will always be suspicious of China’s real intention to participate in multilateral 
frameworks regarding the South China Sea conflict. Superficially it is easier to be seen as 
a cooperative leader. However, the real reason needs further explanations. 
 
Most of literature above located their analyses at the system level and considered China 
as a unitary actor, while Rita Akpan and John W. Garver provided an alternative view. 
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They explained that China’s policy evolution from bilateralism to multilateralism in the 
1990s was caused by Chinese bureaucratic politics.71 
 
Akpan tried to explain China’s engagement into multilateral cooperation by applying 
content analysis methodology. She agreed that China’s intention behind the rhetoric 
embrace of multilateralism was quite doubtful as the reason for China’s multilateral 
policy appeared vague and ambiguous. Holding the realist worldview, China discovered 
several benefits in participating in multilateral framework. Firstly, multilateral 
cooperation with its Southeast Asian counterparts could promote a sense of “Asianism” 
in order to challenge the Western domination. Secondly, it could help to keep a friendly 
relationship within the regional environment. A favorable regional relationship would 
serve China’s ambitions to influence global affairs. Meanwhile, a cooperative stance 
could build up China’s image as a benign power in order to rebut the “China threat” 
theory. Although these were so many gainful reasons for China’s embrace of 
multilateralism, “China’s advocacy of multilateralism was more a tactical than a radical 
change of thinking”.72 Territorial claim was still an uncompromisable issue to China and 
military occupation had never been renounced as an option for its South China Sea policy. 
According to Akpan, such an indecisive posture was “a function of the power struggle 
between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the bureaucratic competition of China’s decision 
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making politburo”.73 With the PLA and SOEs’ increasing influential roles in critical 
decision making, the authority of the CCP had been eroded gradually since Jiang Zemin’s 
presidency. Different interest groups were responsible for China’s foreign policy swings, 
causing China to be considered as an unpredictable actor in the region. 
 
Although Garver agreed that China was not a unitary actor, he had a different view of 
inter-bureaucratic competition from Akpan’s. According to Garver, the divergent views 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the PLA made China’s policy 
towards the South China Sea unpredictable. This was because the PLA insisted on 
exploiting the disputed area, while the MFA cared more about China’s external relations 
and international reputation. As a result of the Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, China feared international isolation. This restrained 
its assertive actions and forced it to embrace the multilateral talks within the region. 
However, according to the author, the PLA had increasingly dominated the political 
lobbying, causing its commitment to multilateralism to become secondary. 
 
Although divergent opinions exist between the different bureaucratic agencies and 
interests, they are not as significant as it was stated by the authors. The main purpose of 
each department within the government is to serve China’s national interest. Although the 
MFA or CCP states that China would like to talk with the other disputants, it never 
renounced its territorial claims and stressed that the sovereignty issue was non-
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negotiable.74 As such, the MFA (or CCP) and PLA had similar voices, only that the 
former was soft while the latter was hard. In view of this, my study will overlook their 
differences and consider China as a unitary actor.  
 
Taking into account all the analyses above, we may find that there are lots of weaknesses 
in liberal and constructive explanations. Realists, at best, give only vague interpretations 
of China’s multilateral engagement. Due to such shortcomings of the existing debates 
over China’s engagement into multilateralism, this study intends to push for further 
clarification, using another theory within neo-realism, that of hegemonic stability, to 
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       2.1.1   THEORY OF HEGEMONIC STABILITY 
 
The theory of hegemonic stability was originated from the politics of international 
economy. According to Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham in the Dictionary of 
International Relations, “stable regimes, particularly in international economic relations, 
depend upon a hegemon establishing norms and rules and then superintending their 
functioning by enlightened use of its capability to encourage other members to work the 
regime under its hegemonical power”.75 The exploration of this theory is largely 
associated with the writings of Charles Kinderberger, Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane, 
and Robert Gilpin.76 
 
Kindleberger is credited as the major advocate of the hegemonic stability theory. His 
analysis, that is resonated and modified by Keohane, mainly focuses on global economy. 
Their arguments are always considered together as their common statement is that the 
hegemon within the international system is considered as a benevolent and altruistic 
leader. The hegemonic state that enjoys its overwhelming power due to its technological 
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and industrial advantages may reshape the international order. However, the hegemon 
will not focus exclusively on its own national interests. Instead, it should create and 
provide public goods to every member state. In order to guarantee the promotion of 
international trade and economic cooperation, the preponderant state will support the 
creation of a liberal regime.77 Organizations can work as a useful instrument for a 
potential hegemon to institutionalize its vision of the system order and legitimize its 
status as the system leader. 
 
Gilpin, on the other hand, provided us with another explanation of the theory, arguing 
that the hegemon is malevolent and self-seeking. His analysis has been expanded to 
security concerns. What the state really cares are relative gains rather than absolute gains. 
The creation of the international order obviously reflects the distribution of power and the 
interests of the hegemon. The hegemon establishes the international regime as an 
instrument to pursue its own interests and increase power vis-à-vis the other subordinate 
states.78 
 
Regardless of this difference, both benign and coercive hegemons are supposed to 
provide public goods to the members of the system and take the major burden of regime 
maintenance. The decline of the hegemon’s power would destabilize the system. As the 
dominant power is losing its ability to enforce compliance, the secondary power would 
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ask for more policy autonomy. It will challenge the status of the dominant country and 
reshape the order in its favor. 
 
Good examples of hegemonic stability theory are nineteenth-century Britain, the United 
States during 1945-1970s, and again in the post-1990s. The Roman Empire and ancient 
China could also be quasi-examples. They just ruled a corner of the world during their 
respective periods. 
 
Having carefully examined the contending arguments of hegemonic stability theory, this 
author mostly agrees with Gilpin’s opinion and believes in the coercive character of 
hegemon. Meanwhile, the theoretical framework of this study also borrows from the 
multiple hierarchy model as the prerequisite assumption79. 
 
The multiple hierarchy model originates from the theory of power transition. According 
to this model, there exists a global hierarchy that includes some regional subsystems, 
namely regional hierarchies.80 Regional power pursues the dominant status within its 
regional hierarchy. It can establish and maintain the regional order. However, the 
regional dominant state is subject to the global power’s intervention although the global 
power seldom interferes in regional affairs.81 
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As a consequence, the theory of hegemonic stability will be discussed within the regional 
hierarchy. The superpower can impose regimes in the international politics for its own 
benefits. The presence of its norms and rules leads to greater stability in the international 
system. Although the public goods provided by the regime benefits all the members 
within the system, it benefits the leader relatively more. The coercive hegemon would use 
force to ensure that the procedures would be accepted and prevent any subordinate state 
from seeking to take a “free ride” on it.  
 
If the secondary state within the regional hierarchy is dissatisfied with the regional status 
quo, it may challenge the regional hegemon or ask the global hegemon for intervention. 
A positive response would depend on the global leader’s perception that the regional 
status quo is grabbing benefit at the expense of global leader’s interests. Then the global 
hegemon would coerce the regional leader to reshape the order. Or else, a negative 
response will take place. The global hegemon will try to avoid being involved in the 
specific issue directly and appease the regional secondary state to abide by the system 
rules. 
 
The coercive hegemon always pursues its dominant status by unilateral and bilateral 
means. In addition, multilateralism can also be used as an instrument to institutionalize its 
preferred order within the system. However, it is not effective all the time. In order to 
make sure that the multilateral mechanism can work for the regional order formation, the 
hegemon has to use force as the deterrence and also take real action if the hegemon 
believes it is necessary. As establishing the norms and rules by force or the threat of force 
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would be very costly, a rational hegemon would take institutional effort as the primary 
means. This paper plans to explore how a coercive power builds up the hegemonic order 
with the help of multilateral means. 
 
The above explanations of the theory can also be applied to interpret the South China Sea 
realities. Based on the multiple hierarchy model, my assumption is that the United States 
has been the superpower governing the global hierarchy since the end of the Cold War.82 
In this study, the countries surrounding the South China Sea area make up a regional 
subsystem.83 China is considered as regional power and is going to institutionalize its 
order within the regional hierarchy. Traditionally, China emphasized unilateral and 
bilateral means in its foreign policy. Since 1990, China has gradually realized the 
importance of multilateralism in publicizing its preferred norms. However, as China’s 
military and economic capabilities remain inferior to American capabilities, China cannot 
threaten the U.S.-sponsored regional order. (See Figure 2.1) From this point of view, the 
United States, as the global power, is a major factor that cannot be overlooked. The U.S. 
concern will be discussed in the later part of this chapter. 
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In order to be a hegemon, a country should possess three qualities. They are the 
capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a 
system that is considered as mutually beneficial to the member states in the group. The 
following sections will examine whether China has such intentions and capabilities to 
pursue regional hegemonic status and also whether the regional order initiated by China 
could be perceived reciprocal to both China and the other South China Sea disputants. 
 
       2.2.1   CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY 
 
                                                                     
                                                                   Global Hierarchy 
                                                US  
Regional Hierarchy 
                   
 
 
                                   China 
                                    S.E.A 
 
 









In face of the shifting international situation since the end of the Cold War, China 
believed that hegemonism and power politics are on the rise all the times.84 China’s main 
goal is to strive for a more influential international position. Its strategy is to create a 
positive environment for domestic modernization.85  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union represented the end of the bipolar system. The United 
States emerged as the only superpower in the world. In Chinese leaders’ worldview, the 
United States is at the top of the global system, together with some regional powers that 
have a lesser degree of influence. 86 However, this is just the intermediate period of the 
system transition. The unipolar system is being deconcentrated. American super power 
has been declining and the rise of one or more alternative power poles is expected. The 
unipolar system will be replaced by a multipolar system in the future.87 In order to avoid 
being disadvantaged by the unchecked American power, China should support the 
formation of a multipolar system. Meanwhile, as a regional power, China has to find its 
place as one of the poles in such a system.88 The other poles include the European Union, 
Russia, and Japan. Acting as a pole, China can be involved in the establishment of new 
international rules. Only then can China shape the international order to serve its national 
interests. 
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The end of the Cold War, however, saw a change in China’s strategic environment. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, China is considered as the next prominent adversary of 
the United States.89 Since the late 1970s, China has been more open and more willing to 
act on the international stage. However, the more China engages globally, the more it 
finds itself challenging American interests. From China’s point of view, the United States 
always stands at the forefront of the “containing China” coalition.90 China also realizes its 
relative weakness in comparison to the United States. As a result, China has been 
cautious, avoiding competition with the United States on global affairs and concentrating 
instead on national development.91 Economic modernization is widely agreed among 
Chinese decision makers as the primary and unavoidable step for achieving world-class 
power status. In order to create a peaceful environment for economic growth, China 
withdrew its attention from a global view to a regional view. China’s leaders realized that 
maintaining stable relations with its neighboring states was vital for China’s 
development.92 Achieving a regional power status is seen as the prerequisite for China’s 
global ambitions. China should be patient and postpone its plans of pursuing superpower 
status. In Chinese leader’s word, it is to “conceal our abilities and bide our time”.93  
 
While aiming at economic development, China is seeking for possible outlet for its power 
projection. Since the end of the Cold War, China’s security concern has been reoriented 
to peripheral territorial disputes from its early confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
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Currently, China’s regional security concerns are largely derived from formal American 
security alliances with several states on the maritime periphery of East Asia, which would 
create a “crescent” around China.94 China feels insecure about the American-Japanese 
alliance to its North, American arms sales to Taiwan to its East, and American bilateral 
military agreements with specific Southeast Asian nations to its South.95 Among these 
several concerns, Southeast Asia is considered as the weak point of the American alliance 
system. Thus, the South China Sea area emerges as a good platform for China’s power 
maneuvers.  
 
2.2.2 CHINA’S INTENTIONS IN THE REGION 
 
China’s intention in the South China Sea area is to achieve hegemonic status to serve its 
long-term global strategy.96 In order to build up hegemonic stability in the region, China 
is trying to make its practices accepted as the regional rules or norms by the others 
disputants. Multilateralism has emerged as a good opportunity for China to fulfill its 
intentions. 
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Chinese leaders have been quite cautious when they talk about hegemonism. China 
persists in its anti-hegemonism foreign policy while reassuring its neighbors that a rising 
China will never seek hegemonic status. The hegemon was always considered by China 
as the imposition of the will of the domineering state upon others.  
 
However, according to The-Yi Huang, hegemon or hegemony (the term ba in Chinese) 
does not necessarily carry a derogatory connotation.97 In ancient China, the hegemons, to 
a large extent, were backed by their moral superiority. The “Middle Kingdom” (the term 
Zhong Guo in Chinese) was a powerful country and respected by its smaller neighbors. It 
enjoyed its dominant status and tributary system in East Asia. Nevertheless, during the 
18th and 19th centuries, China lost its regional superiority. It experienced a terrible 
humiliation by the Western invaders. After the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China, it remained a weak country and feared the intervention by outsiders. “Anti-
hegemonism” was released as a foreign policy to protect China’s national interest.98 
Having experienced rapid economic growth since the late 1970s, China began to reassure 
its neighbors that it would never seek hegemony even if it became a great power.99 
However, Denny Roy cannot be convinced by China’s statements. He reexamined 
China’s unique characteristics that are supposed to support China’s anti-hegemonism 
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logic. He argued that there was no sufficient reason to prove that China would be “less 
inclined towards hegemony than any of the other great powers”.100 
 
Meanwhile, a large number of China’s experts agree that there is a growing popularity of 
realpolitik thinking among Chinese leaders. As such, the term “hegemon” was always 
used by China to label other powers whose intent on grabbing dominant status would be 
at the expense of China. That was the reason why China protested against Soviet 
expansionism, aggressive Vietnamese actions in Indo-China and U.S. global 
encroachment. As a consequence, China’s vocal pledge of “anti-hegemonism” cannot 
deny its hegemony pursuance strategy in the region. 
 
Logically, the reason for China to join the regional multilateral mechanisms is to 
publicize its proposal and solve the South China Sea territorial disputes in its favor. In the 
face of the emerging multilateralism in the region, China is an increasingly active player. 
China’s New Security Concept has given great emphasis on a cooperative security 
approach within a multilateral setting.101 However, China is still afraid of being taken 
advantage of by the partners in the multilateral frameworks. As a result, China only joins 
the multilateral cooperative mechanism when China believes that it is largely favorable to 
its interests.102 Thus, the ARF and the MPCSCS provide good platforms for China to deal 
with the South China Sea disputes in a multilateral game. Being the master of the game, 
China can practice realpolitik against its regional participants. Having experienced 
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dramatic economic and military growth, China feels more confident in coping with 
Southeast Asian nations multilaterally. China is skilled in dividing and then silencing 
ASEAN’s united protest against China’s unilateral moves. The possibility of discussing 
the South China Sea disputes during the meeting largely depends on China’s agenda. 
China’s joint exploration proposal seems to be the only possible way for the disputants to 
choose. 
 
In addition, when China’s preferred order was challenged by the other claimants in this 
region, it had not hesitated to punish them. A good example is China’s occupation of 
Mischief Reef. In May 1993, Philippine President Fidel Ramos ordered the expansion of 
military facilities in the “Kalayaan Island” for civilian and military use. Subsequently in 
May 1994, the Philippine Department of Energy granted an oil exploration permit in 
waters west of the Palawan Island. The contract was signed between Vaalco Energy of 
the United States and its Philippine subsidiary, Alcorn Petroleum and Minerals.103 
Feeling betrayed by Philippine actions, China decided to punish its little neighbor in 
order to ensure its proposal of “joint exploration”. As a result, China carried out its 
physical occupation on the Mischief Reef in 1995 for better surveillance coverage of any 
Philippine-sponsored oil exploration. The same case took place when Vietnam decided to 
explore the oil unilaterally. China sent two warships to block the re-supply of a 
Vietnamese oil-drilling rig to prevent it from working in the Wananbei-21 area.104  
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2.2.3 CHINA’S CAPABILITIES 
 
In the 1990s, China emerged as a great power in East Asia.105 China has the world’s 
largest population and possesses sheer geographical size. Besides its impressive 
demographic and geographic advantage vis-à-vis Southeast Asian nations, China has also 
witnessed massive growth in its economic and military capabilities. These formidable 





China has realized the importance of economic development and believes that gaining 
status as a great economic power is inevitable for future resolution of the South China 
Sea conflicts to its advantage.106 Thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s open-door reforms in the 
1980s, China grabbed the ticket for the “global economy train”. China has been 
experienced lasting high rate of economic growth. China’s economic success is 
unexpected, given the daunting task of simultaneously converting from a state-planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy. Its economy has grown faster than any other 
economy in history. As a result, China has been widely praised as a “global engine”.107  
 
                                                 
105 S. Harris and G. Klintworth, eds. China as a Great Power (Melbourne: Longman, 1995). 
106 Pan Min, “ARF and China”, 327. 
107 Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army 
War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 1. 
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As the Chinese economy rapidly develops and integrates into the world economy, it has 
averaged a miraculous 9.8 percent GDP growth annually.108 According to the statistics in 
1989 and 1990, China’s GDP was even larger than the total GDP of the Southeast Asian 
countries (See table 2.1). As a consequence, Southeast Asian countries cannot ignore 
China's explosive economy. China’s rising economy is considered as both “challenge and 
opportunity”.109 China is very competitive in grabbing overseas markets and swallowing 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the region. On the other hand, China’s economic 
boom in the last two decades has benefited both Chinese interests and also the world 
economy as a whole. It provides a huge market for the Southeast Asian economies. Since 
1990, China’s trade with Southeast Asian countries has been expanding steadily (See 
table 2.2).110 In the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China’s stable currency 
policy and financial support for ASEAN helped prevent the situation from worsening. As 
a result, China is widely respected as a responsible power by its Southeast Asian 
neighbors.111 
 
Table 2.1 GDP Comparisons between China and Southeast Asian Nations, 
1989 and 1990* 
 
Country 1989 1990 
                                                 
108 Fei-Ling Wang, “China's Self Image and Strategic Intentions: National Confidence and Political 
Insecurity," paper presented to the conference "War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait,” sponsored by the 
Program in Asian Studies, Duke University, and Triangle Institute in Security Studies,  February 26-27, 
1999. 
109 For example, Rodolfo Severino, former Secretary General of ASEAN, describes China as a competitor, 
see Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN and China-Partners in Competition, presented at the ASEAN Forum 
Sponsored by the Asean Consulates Guangzhou, June 9, 2001, [cited September 6,2005], available from: 
http://www.aseansec.org/3162.htm. ; for a contrary view, see Derek da Cunha, "Southeast Asian Perception 
of China's Future Security Role in its Backyard," in In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese 
Foreign Policy and Military Development, ed. Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND, 1998), 115. 
110 According to the figure, China’s trade with Brunei, Laos, and Myanmar decreased. The reason is that 
China’s trades with the above countries were badly influenced by the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
111 Ming Pao, April 18, 1998. 
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Brunei 3494971807.306 3590892288.679 
Cambodia 1414703191.157 1431116423.619 
Indonesia 104976652875.467 114426338038.105 
Laos 811262451.431 865674320.028 
Malaysia 38983336986.610 42775068672.432 
Myanmar 8009419310.773 8235039063.876 
Philippines 43005530296.377 44311593755.785 
Singapore 34365665671.741 37449807727.320 
Thailand 76770630725.224 85343732533.916 
Vietnam 6158030277.225 6471740605.911 
Southeast Asian Total 317990203593.311 344901003429.671 
China 373575900365.473 387771784579.361 
* Gross domestic product at market prices, US$, constant 1990 prices 
 
Source: UN Statistics Division Estimates112, [cited June 24, 2005], available from: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdbdemo/cdb_series_xrxx.asp?series_code=19470 
 
Table 2.2 China’s Trade with the Southeast Asian Countries 
(In US$, million) 
 
Country 1990 1995 1999 
Brunei 11.83 34.51 8.1 
Cambodia 3.24 57.34 160.12 
Indonesia 1,182.26 3,490.32 4,829.98 
Laos 16.19 54.22 31.72 
Malaysia 1,183.07 3,351.59 5,279.34 
Myanmar 327.62 767.35 508.21 
Philippines 295.13 1,305.91 2,286.81 
Singapore 2,825.24 6,898.47 8,563.33 
Thailand 1,194.46 3,362.52 4,215.61 
Vietnam 7.23 1,052.35 1,218.15 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, People’s Republic of China, compiler, China Statistical Yearbook 
(Beijing: China Statistical Press), various issues. 
 
 
From China’s perspective, the establishment of long-standing and stable relations with 
Southeast Asian nations is an important factor in sustaining economic development. 
However, as a consequence of rapid economic growth, China faces an increasingly 
                                                 
112 The reason for not using the source of China’s National Bureau of Statistics is that China’s GDP report 
may cause either underreporting or overreporting problems. 
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serious problem in the form of resource scarcity. China’s high-consumption growth mode 
has made it eager for foreign resources. China’s increasing dependence on imported oil 
has caused a growing significance of sea lanes in China’s strategic thinking. Meanwhile, 
the potential oil deposits and fishery resources in the South China Sea region are also 
attractive. Having control over the region would help to sustain China’s future economic 
development. As a rational actor, China’s hidden concern for seeking the involvement of 
regional interdependence is to make the Southeast Asian nations more dependent on 
China. Such a relationship would contribute to the establishment of regional hegemony. 
In the long term, sustaining economic growth will provide the best vehicle for resolving 




In terms of military power, China is a giant compared with its Southeast Asian neighbors. 
China is the only country in the vicinity of the South China Sea to deploy nuclear 
weapons. China’s military expenditure was several times that of the overall expenditures 
of the other South China Sea disputants in 1985 and 2001. China’s soldiers outnumber all 
in the region (See table 2.3). China’s relative military strength gives it the ability to win a 
regional war against the others.  
 
Table 2.3 International Comparisons of Defense Expenditure and Military 
Manpower, 1985 and 2001 (Constant 2000 US$) 
 
 Defense Expenditure (US$m) Numbers in Armed Forces (000)
Country 1985 2001 1985 2001
China 30,009 46,049 3,900.0 2,310.0
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Brunei 310 279 4.1 5.9
Cambodia n.a. 188 35.0 140.0
Indonesia 3,539 860 278.1 297.0
Laos 83 19 53.7 29.1
Malaysia 2,667 3,249 110.0 100.5
Myanmar 1,328 1,088 186.0 344.0
Philippines 717 1,065 114.8 107.0
Singapore 1,796 4,280 55.0 60.5
Thailand 2,833 1,831 235.3 306.0
Vietnam 3,628 2,351 1,027.0 484.0
Total* 10,861 7,804 1,534.0 994.4
 
*It includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam, which are the South 
China Sea disputants against China. 
Source: The Military Balance, Vol.102, No.1 (October 1, 2002), 334. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, China has experienced a dramatic shift in its military 
strategy. Mao Zedong’s principles of people’s war became outdated for guiding military 
development in modern China and was replaced by the high-tech oriented strategy. 
Shocked by U.S. military strength in the Gulf War, China’s decision makers realized the 
importance of high technology in contemporary warfare. In addition, growing economic 
strength also led to a buildup of China’s high-tech military capability.  
 
The navy occupies a key position in military modernization.113 In order to serve China’s 
long-term global ambitions, the PLA Navy (PLAN) leaders called for an evolution of 
strategy from coastal defense to offshore defense, and finally built up its blue-water navy. 
In the short term, the preparations for safeguarding the South China Sea territories, 
especially the Spratlys, are perceived as the main impetus for the PLAN’s 
                                                 
113 You Ji, “A Test Case for China’s defense and Foreign Policies,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.16, 
No.4 (March 1995), 378. 
 57
modernization.114 In China’s views, a fully updated PLAN, especially the South Sea Fleet 
that has direct access to the South China Sea, is expected to support strategic deterrence 
and can be used as a tactical force if it is necessary. The South Sea Fleet’s defense 
perimeter can be extended from coastal defense to between 200 and 400 nautical miles,115 
and even further in defense of the strategic sea-lanes in the Straits of Malacca. According 
to China’s official publications, to establish the regional order of shelving the territorial 
disputes and exploiting the resources jointly “would be cosmetic without a stronger 
navy”.116 
 
Since the late 1980s, China has been active in establishing a permanent military presence 
in the South China Sea.117 It is pursuing a new generation of major surface combatants, 
larger submarines and long-range aircraft that could extend its military reach and enhance 
its capability to inflict combat damage.118 The surface combatants include a single 6,000-
ton Luhai Class missile destroyer, two 4,200-ton Luhu Class missile destroyers, and ten 
2,250-ton Jiangwei Class frigates.119 The Song Class submarine that is fitted with the C-
801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles began to serve the navy in the late 1990s.120 In 
addition, the PLA Air Force has been equipped with over 120 Russian-made Su-27 and 
Su-30 fighter aircraft, as well as indigenously produced third-generation aircraft such as 
                                                 
114 You Ji and You Xu, “In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy’s Maritime Survey in the 1990s,” 
Pacific Review, No.2 (1991), 137-149. 
115 Paul H. B. Godwin, “From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Towards 
2000,” in China's Military in Transition, eds., David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang (Oxford : Clarendon 
Press in association with the Council on Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), Taipei, 1997), 205. 
116 Japan Economic Newswire, 19 May 1993. 
117 Esmond D. Smith, Jr. “China’s Aspirations in the Spratly Islands,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol.16, No.3 (Dec 1994), 280 
118 You Ji, “A Test Case for China’s defense and Foreign Policies”, 381. 
119 “Surface Combatants”, Chinese Defence Today [cited September 4, 2005], available from: 
http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/default.asp. 
120 Lee Jae-Hyung, “China’s Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western pacific and the Indian Ocean,” 
Vol. 24, No.3 (December 2002), 551.  
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the J-10, J-11 and JH-7.121 China’s modernization of its naval and air forces largely 
depends on acquisitions from the existing Soviet arsenal. Although the Soviet product is 
quite obsolete when compared to modern Western technology, it still serves as an 
effective form of deterrence in the region. According to a comparison of the main actors’ 
military strength, the figures favor China. (See table 2.4) Neither Vietnam nor the 
Philippines have the capability to check China’s military actions in the region. 
 
Table 2.4 Main Actors' Military Strength 
Main Actors' Military Strength 
 China Vietnam The Philippines 
Tanks 9,200 2,000 126 
Submarines 51 0 0 
Destroyers and Frigates 55 7 1 
Patrol and Coastal Aircraft 870 55 44 
Combat Aircraft 5,845 190 43 
Armed Forces 2,930,000 572,000 106,500 
Source: available from: http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/ice/spratly.htm 
 
Meanwhile, the PLAN is considering the addition of an aircraft carrier to its fleet. In 
1993, Vice-Admiral Zhang Yuanhai who is the commissar of the East Sea Fleet stated 
that they were preparing for the construction of an aircraft carrier.122  The aircraft carrier 
would increase China’s power projection capability dramatically and would be the key 
step for China in becoming a maritime power. 
 
                                                 
121 “Air Power”, Chinese Defence Today, [cited 4 September 2005], available from: 
http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/default.asp. 
122 United Daily News, March 15, 1993. 
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Although China is increasingly eager to be a maritime power, it will not regard military 
means as priority for solving territorial disputes. It is still costly for China to establish the 
regional order by force. China openly stated that it would not launch a nuclear attack 
against non-nuclear-weapon states and states in nuclear-weapon-free zones. China also 
pledged that it would not initiate a nuclear war. That is “no first use” (NFU).123 As a 
consequence, the nuclear weapons function as deterrence, and will unlikely be used in the 
regional warfare.124 Meanwhile, the Southeast Asian nations, especially Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia, have equipped themselves with highly advanced American and 
British armaments. Without the deployment of well-operated aircraft carriers, it is 
possible for China to lose a battle in this “American Lake”.125 As military clashes are 
risky and unpredictable, China’s military presence in the South China Sea does not 
necessarily ensure that it will help claim more territory. Therefore, the pursuit of strong 
military capabilities is just to help Beijing augment its bargaining leverage in future 
negotiations.126 
 
Taking into account all the factors mentioned above, we can conclude that China is a 
great power in the South China Sea area. Its growing economic and military strength will 
aid China in practicing its hegemonic intentions in the region. 
                                                 
123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, Fact sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament 
and Reduction, April 27, 2004 [cited April 27, 2004], available from: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/cjjk/2622/t93539.htm. 
124 Another view is that if the country has nuclear weapons but does not use it in actual wars, it cannot 
constitute real war deterrence. See Hu Wenlong and Cha Jinlu, eds., Xiandai jundui bingzhong zhanshu 
(Beijing: Military Science Press, 1991), 245; for an overview of China’s unclear deterrence, see Alastair 
Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence versus 
Multilateral Arms Control,” in China's Military in Transition, eds., David Shambaugh and Richard H. 
Yang, 288-300. 
125 Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.2 (Mar/Apr 1997), 37-
38. 
126 Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China’s Earlier Territorial Settlements,”  
Pacific Affairs, Vol.68, No.1 (Spring 1995), 34. 
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2.2.4 CHINA’S PROPOSED REGIONAL ORDER 
 
In order to build up hegemonic stability in the region, China has to initiate a regional 
order and provide public goods for the subordinate states. This author agrees that the 
regional order could be beneficial for both China and the other South China Sea 
disputants and China, as the regional leader, would gain relatively more.  
 
Being afraid of the American global power, China cannot challenge its regional interests. 
As a result, China has reassured the United States that it would not forcefully grab control 
of the whole region, especially the sea-lanes for oil transportation. China’s promise also 
caters to other claimants’ interests. Meanwhile, China has to maintain a stable peripheral 
environment so as to safeguard its economic development at home. Thus, the space for 
China’s power maneuver in the region is quite limited.127 The idea of “shelving the 
territorial disputes while developing the joint exploration”, which was first initiated by 
Deng Xiaoping in 1984,128 was considered the only possible way to solve the South 
China Sea territorial disputes in China’s interests. 
 
However, it does not necessarily mean that China will abnegate its claims of the 
territories in the region. Deng Xiaoping reportedly said, “Frankly speaking, the issue of 
                                                 
127 Yan Xuetong, “China’s post-Cold War Security Strategy,” in China and Asia-Pacific Security, ed. Yan 
Xuetong (Beijng: Shishi Press, 1999), 61. 
128 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol.3 (Renmin Press, Beijing, 1993), 49, 87-88; the “joint 
development” concept was provided in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, Article 
74 and Article 83. 
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sovereignty is not subject to discussion.”129 Although contemporary Chinese scholars are 
trying to contest the top priority of sovereignty recently,130 no change is expected within 
the official arguments. From Mao Zedong to Jiang Zemin, every leader publicly 
announced that they did not allow the loss of territory within their respective governing 
period, or else they would be considered as malefactor to the country and would be 
notorious for thousands of years.131 As a result, the China’s official line is that 
“Sovereignty is mine, postpone disputes, exploit the resources for mutual benefit”.132 
 
Because of the multilateral nature of the South China Sea disputes, a multilateral solution 
cannot be overlooked. The multilateral mechanisms in the region provide China with an 
opportunity to institutionalize its regional order. If the order can be accepted by the other 
players, China can provide hegemonic stability in the region. As the hegemon of this 
subsystem, China wishes to be respected as the nominal owner of the South China Sea 
territories. In response, China will provide an agreement of joint exploitation of the South 
China Sea resources as public goods to the secondary states. China will also provide 
military support to keep the regional peace and prosperity. As a result, the South China 
                                                 
129 Jiang Changbin, “Ershiyi shiji: Zhongguo, bawuo ziji de mingyun,” (Twenty-first Century: China 
Masters Its Own Destiny), Mianxiang ershiyi shiji (In Face of Twenty-first Century), 141; see also Selected 
Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol.3, 12. 
130 Yu Zhengliang, “Fazhanzhong guojia zai zhuquan wenti shang de dangdai xuanze,” (Contemporary 
Choices for Developing Countries on the Issue of Sovereignty), Mianxiang ershiyi shiji (In face of Twenty-
first century), 333-339 and Fang Xiangqin, “Guoji guanxi zhong de guojia zhuquan ruogan wenti yixi,” 
(Exploring Several Issues Regarding State Sovereignty in International Relations), Mianxiang ershiyi shiji 
(In face of Twenty-first century), 340-352. In contrast, Huang Renwei and Liu Jie provided a theoretical 
support for the top priority of the territorial sovereignty, see Huang Renwei and Liu Jie, New Theories of 
National Sovereignty (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2003), 311. 
131 Interview, July 2005. 
132 Udai Bhanu Singh, ASEAN Regional Forum and Security of the Asia-Pacific (New Delhi: Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses, 2001), 50; Pan Min, “ARF and China”, 321.  Guided by this principle, a 
special office, called “experts meeting”, was reportedly established on 6 October 1995. The main task of 
the office was to seek sovereignty over the islands by peaceful means and expansion of the scale of actual 
control over the Spratlys. See Lien Ho Pao, Hong Kong, October 6, 1995 and Summary of World Broadcast: 
Far East, No. 2444. 
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Sea can be considered as a sea of cooperation rather than a sea of conflicts. By building 
regional hegemony in the future, China can ensure its favorite periphery environment for 
its national development and gain a stronger power projection capability that would serve 
its further ambitions. 
 
2.3 THE UNITED STATES AS A MAJOR CONCERN 
 
The prerequisite of China’s strategic aim to be the hegemon in the South China Sea is the 
power vacuum left by the United States.133 Since the end of the Cold War, the United 
States has become the only superpower in the world. It stands at the top of the global 
system. In order to maintain its hegemonic status, the United States is trying to build up 
its desired international order to prevent any secondary power from challenging its power 
and role. 
 
According to the multiple hierarchy model, “the overall dominant power is little 
concerned with who specifically controls these various parts of the globe, so long as the 
mineral riches are exported and the global status quo undisturbed”.134 As a result, 
America’s objective in Asia is to prevent any single country from gaining overwhelming 
power in the region.135 In reference to the South China Sea conflict, Liselotte Odgaard 
characterized the U.S, policy as one of “guarded non-involvement”.136  
                                                 
133 Michael Leifer, “Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection,” 50. 
134 Ronald L. Tammen ed., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House 
Publishers, 2000), 68. 
135 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, “The Coming Conflict with America,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, 
No.2 (March/April 1997), 21. 
136 Liselotte Odgaard, “Deterrence and Co-operation in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, Vol.23, No.2 (August 2001), 296. 
 63
 
The South China Sea region is not considered to be as strategically important as it was 
during the Soviet-U.S. rivalry. As the Soviet Union withdrew its military presence from 
Cam Ranh Bay, the United States did not see any necessity to bear such a military burden 
in the region. The 1990s saw a gradual reduction of U.S. overseas military troops from 
Southeast Asia. Although some Southeast Asian countries insisted on retaining American 
presence in the region in order to balance China’s potential power, the strategic 
importance was not as attractive to the United States as before. As a result, the United 
States, under both Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton, has refused to assume this 
responsibility. The process of retreat was marked by the loss of the Philippine Subic Bay 
naval base and Clark airfield in 1992. As a consequence of U.S. withdrawal from the 
region, Southeast Asia has to share the military burden and, to a large extent, become 
dependent on its own capabilities.  
 
Instead of political concern, America’s major concern in the region nowadays is its 
economic interests. For example, in 1988, the annual trade turnover of the United States 
through the South China Sea region was about US$300 billion. This exceeded its trans-
Atlantic trade in the same year (approximately US$186 billion).137 Furthermore, the sea-
lane for oil and gas transportation is also vital for the United States and its allies. In order 
to keep its economic growth, the United States would like to maintain peace and stability 
in the region. As was mentioned in the introduction of the study, the U.S.’ major strategy 
                                                 
137 T. W. Huang and Li Z. Y., “The Changing Security Scene in East Asia—An Analysis of the US 
Perspective,” in ASEAN-China, Hong Kong Forum 1990, Hong Kong: Royal Park Hotel, Shatin, August 7-
8, 1990.  
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in the region is to make sure that the sea-lanes would not be controlled exclusively by one 
country.  
 
In order not to provoke the United States, China has pledged to respect the freedom of 
navigation in the region.138 What is more, a naval clash in the South China Sea would be 
over quickly, and would probably not endanger the security of adjacent sea-lanes.139 As a 
consequence, it is possible that the United States would not play an active role in the 
conflict, although it understands that China may pursue its goal of regional hegemony. In 
the face of China’s growing naval capability, Admiral Richard Macke, who is the 
commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, agreed that the United States should engage 
China rather than directly confront it. The United States should cultivate China to support 
the international status quo.140 Meanwhile, during a visit to Singapore, he stated, “Asia 
and West must accept the fact that China may well develop a modern navy, including 
aircraft carriers-intended to project Chinese power overseas.”141 In the wake of China’s 
seizure of Mischief Reef, the then U.S. Admiral Warren Christopher publicly emphasized 
the importance of maintaining peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the region. 
However, he continued that the United States “has been no more forthcoming on 
American responsibilities in the South China Sea and has refused to take sides over 
                                                 
138 China insists that it highly respect the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. China’s territorial 
claims in the region do not disrupt the freedom of navigation supported by the international law. China has 
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jurisdiction”.142 This stance was evident even during the honeymoon period of U.S.-
Philippines military cooperation, when the United States refused to accept any obligation 
to defend Philippine claims of disputed territories.143  
 
Another reason for the United States distancing itself from specific issues is the joint 
exploratory oil operation in the region. Considering China’s contract with U.S. Crestone 
Energy Corporation and Vietnam’s contract with U.S. Mobil Corporation, it is difficult 
for the United States to take sides and risk attacking another U.S.-owned drilling rig. 
 
However, America’s low-key presence in the South China Sea does not mean that China 
can do anything as it likes. In reality, China’s regional policy largely depends on U.S. 
response. Remaining the pacific power, the United States can send its fleet back easily in 
case of the escalation of regional conflicts in order to protect its interests.144 Furthermore, 
the terrorist attack on September 11th 2001 saw a return of U.S. attention to Southeast 
Asia. The United States became more active in safeguarding the maritime security in the 
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CHAPTER 3:  
CASE STUDY:  
INFORMAL WORKSHOP OF “MANAGING POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA” 
 
 
In this chapter, the author will apply case studies to test China’s multilateral diplomacy in 
the South China Sea conflicts. Since 1990, China has been showing its willingness to 
utilize the regional multilateral mechanism for conflict resolution. According to the 
hypothesis mentioned in the previous chapters, the reason for changing attitude towards 
multilateralism was that China had realized it allowed them the opportunity to influence 
the other disputants within the group and could be used to build up its hegemonic 
stability in the region. As a consequence, China’s officials and experts, who attended in a 
“private capacity”, began to talk with their Southeast Asian counterparts within 
multilateral conferences and workshops. The most significant informal multilateral 
cooperative mechanism was the workshop entitled “Managing Potential Conflicts in the 
South China Sea” (MPCSCS) hosted by Indonesia. This chapter will examine China’s 
multilateral maneuver in the MPCSCS Workshop. 
 
The workshop was initiated in 1989 by Indonesian diplomat Hasjim Djalal and Professor 
Ian Townsend-Gault from Canada. Since the late 1980s, for all contents and purposes, the 
Cambodian question was on the right track towards settlement. The easing of the conflict 
shed bright light on the importance of regional peace and prosperity. Prevention of the 
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South China Sea disputes from escalating emerged as the next key issue on the regional 
security agenda.146 With the financial support from the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), the workshop started in 1990 and met annually. The key 
ideas behind the workshop were (1) to seek areas of cooperation in order to prevent 
conflicts and (2) to create a comfortable platform for the claimants to solve the territory 
and sovereignty disputes through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).147 Due to the 
informal nature of the workshop, experts or officials from the respective countries 
enjoyed much greater latitude to exchange ideas and information without being bound by 
their public positions. The informal nature of the workshop was widely welcomed by the 
participants and considered as the most suitable way for solving the South China Sea 
conflicts at that time.148 
 
At the very beginning, China feared the internationalization of the South China Sea 
disputes and demonstrated its objection to join multilateral workshops. Having 
recognized the informal nature of the meeting and ASEAN’s leading role in the 
workshop, China began to change its attitude towards the multilateral mechanism and 
became an active participant. China’s purpose for entering into the MPCSCS Workshop 
was to publicize its regional order for contributing to its buildup of hegemonic stability. 
China’s preferred order in the region was for it to be respected as the nominal owner of 
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the South China Sea territories, to promote a stable and prosperous region for creating a 
good peripheral environment for China’s national development, and to jointly explore the 
South China Sea resources with the other disputants for mutual economic benefits. 
Consequently, China’s strategies in the workshop were to prevent any distant power from 
interfering in the South China Sea disputes, to avoid any political and security discussion 
about territorial and sovereignty issues if it was not to China’s interests at the annual 
meetings, and to make its proposal of “shelving the territorial disputes while developing 
the joint exploration” acceptable to the other participants. Guided by the purpose and 
strategies mentioned above, China began its multilateral maneuvers in the MPCSCS 
Workshop. 
 
The First MPCSCS Workshop was held in Bali, Indonesia (January 1990). Djalal gave 
opening remarks and emphasized, “the workshop is intended as a platform for policy-
orientated discussions, not only for academic exchanges of views”.149 In order to retain a 
decisive role for ASEAN in the series meetings, the participants in this workshop were 
restrictedly six ASEAN members.150 The workshop initiated six possible areas of 
discussion. They were:  
 
a). Territorial and sovereignty issues, 151 
b). Political and security issues,  
c). Marine scientific research and environmental protection,  
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d). Safety of navigation,  
e). Resources management, 
f). Institutional mechanism for cooperation.  
 
In order to prevent the discussions from falling into a stalemate, the workshop provided a 
5-minute stage for each South China Sea claimant to explain their respective stances 
without entering into any discussion. Then the workshop reached an agreement that all 
the South China Sea parties, especially the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam, 
should be invited to the second meeting.152 
 
In preparation for the inclusion of China for the Second Workshop, the ASEAN countries 
discussed the sincerity of China’s proposal and worked out a strategy to deal with China. 
Deng Xiaoping in 1984 stressed that the idea of “shelving the territorial disputes while 
developing the joint exploration” was the only possible way to solve the South China Sea 
territorial disputes in China’s interests.153 Although some of the Southeast Asian 
disputants maintained that discussions on the territorial and sovereignty issue should be 
given priority for the workshop,154 they realized it was not realistic due to China’s strong 
objection. Considering China’s proposal, the workshop agreed on the possibility of 
applying the joint development concept in the South China Sea. “In any discussion 
concerning the jurisdictional difficulties in the South China Sea, the subject of joint 
development arises sooner rather than later.”155 With the significant obstacle cleared, 
China accepted the invitation from the MPCSCS Workshop. Before attending the 
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meetings, China had started influencing the workshop’s agenda. During Li Peng’s visit in 
Singapore, he announced that China was prepared to set aside the territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea and pursue cooperation with the other claimants to explore the 
region collectively.156 Later, China again demonstrated that sovereignty issues should not 
be put on the discussion table.157 
 
As such, we can conclude that the workshop did compromise in order to induce China’s 
participation. China’s preferred order in the region has influenced the workshop ever 
since its inception. Thus, a closer look at China’s implementation of its strategies during 
the following workshops is discussed next. 
 
       3.1   SHELVING THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES WHILE UNDERTAKING 
JOINT EXPLORATIONS 
 
In accordance with China’s strategy, the annual workshops can be divided into two stages. 
The workshops held from 1991, when China began to participate in the workshop, till 
1993 was the first stage. During this stage, China focused on demonstrating its claims of 
the region and silencing all political and security talk on this issue.158 Meanwhile, China 
induced the other disputants to the discussion table to focus on joint development. The 
second stage covered the period from 1994 to 2001. Due mainly to China’s efforts, both 
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the free presentation and specific sessions on political and security issues were removed 
from the workshop agenda. The meetings paid most attention to technical cooperative 
projects for joint development. 
 
Since the Second Workshop, which was held in Bandung (July 1991), all regional states 
or authorities except Cambodia have been involved in the meetings. The Chinese team, 
headed by Wang Yinfan who was the director of the Asia Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, was sent to the Second Workshop. During the fourth session of the 
workshop where political and security issues were discussed, Wang reiterated China’s 
claims of the territory. He emphasized that the whole South China Sea, including the 
Paracels and Spratlys, was indisputably China’s territory.159 Building upon this premise, 
the Chinese team emphasized joint development. They were very active in publicizing 
the proposal of “shelving the disputes and conducting joint development”.160 China 
expressed great interest in “cooperation in the protection of maritime living resources, 
control of maritime pollution, search and rescue operations, scientific research, anti-
piracy, exchange of maritime information, studies on typhoons and changes of sea level, 
and safety of navigation”.161 Although the other participants in the meeting did not agree 
with China’s strong stance on the territorial issue, they still appreciated China’s entry into 
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the workshop. They had at least drawn China to the discussion table. All the members 
agreed on the principle of resolving disputes in the South China Sea through peaceful 
means. However, considering the difficulty in discussing the territorial issue within the 
group, they had to alter their plans and paid more attention to the issue of cooperative 
work that was less likely to pose difficulties between the countries concerned.162 As a 
consequence, the participants reached an agreement on cooperating in three areas, namely 
marine scientific research, marine environmental protection, and safety of navigation.163 
During the Second Workshop, China had “impressed the other participants with its 
official stance on the various issues”164 and meanwhile consoled them by stating that 
China would not seek hegemony in the region.165 Even though the First Workshop had 
identified six possible areas for discussion, progress was only made with reference to 
cooperative work. The political and sovereignty issues were not considered or discussed 
by the workshop as China wished. China performed very well in its debut in the 
workshop, which has been proceeding towards China’s favored direction.  
 
The Third MPCSCS Workshop was held in Yogjakarta in July 1992. The major 
achievement of this meeting was the agreement of establishing two Technical Working 
Groups (TWG). One was in the area of Marine Scientific Research (TWG-MSR) and the 
other was in the area of Resources Assessment (TWG-RA).  
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China’s unilateral move in the South China Sea raised a sensitive issue for discussion at 
the Third Workshop. In order to strengthen China’s preferred order in the region, China 
passed the Law of the "Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones" in February 1992. The law 
restated that both the Paracels and the Spratlys should be included in China’s claims in 
the region. The law provided legislative backing to China’s position on the South China 
Sea issue and authorized the use of military force to prevent other states from occupying 
the territories. In May 1992, China National Offshore Oil Corporation signed a joint 
exploration contract with a U.S. company, namely Crestone Energy Corporation, to 
explore the oil in disputed waters.166 China was also prepared to send naval troops to 
safeguard the company.167 China’s unilateral move certainly increased tensions for the 
forthcoming workshop. In preparation for the meeting, China’s strategy was to defend its 
claims of the South China Sea and draw participants’ attention from territorial disputes to 
cooperation in joint development. As expected, China’s action was challenged by 
participants from Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. They asked Chinese delegates about 
the real intention of China in the South China Sea and stated that China’s assertive move 
in the region would result in the escalation of potential conflicts.168 Facing suspicion from 
the other group members, China, once again, demonstrated its ownership of the 
“undisputed sovereignty”. Meanwhile, Chinese participants insisted that they had every 
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right to pass the law on territorial sea and contiguous zone and thereafter grant the oil 
concession to a U.S. company.169 
 
Clarifying its stance, however, was not the only reason for China to join the multilateral 
talk. China also wanted to keep its periphery stable and make its “joint development” 
proposal acceptable to the other disputants. Therefore, China emphasized the importance 
of regional peace and cooperation. China tried to persuade the other disputants to set 
aside the temporary disputes and move on to the agenda of joint development.170 
Considering China’s unilateral move earlier that year and its strong defense in the 
workshop, the other group members realized the intentions beneath the “joint 
development” proposal. That was “Sovereignty is mine, postpone disputes, and exploit 
the resources for mutual benefit.” It was not acceptable for them to respect China’s 
nominal ownership of the whole region and jointly exploit the resources on what would 
be Chinese territory. However, in order to avoid confrontation and keep China on the 
discussion table, they had to restrain their protests and place more weight on cooperative 
works. As a consequence, the workshop specified the possible areas of cooperation that 
“did not impact on or attempt to prejudice questions of territorial sovereignty”.171 Two 
proposals brought by China were discussed during the meeting. They were “developing 
interregional cooperation to ensure the safety of maritime traffic” and “regional 
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cooperation in decreasing maritime disasters”.172 This culminated in the joint agreement 
to establish two TWGs, namely TWG-MSR and TWG-RA.173 
 
The Fourth MPCSCS Workshop was held in Surabaya in August 1993. The TWG-MSR 
and TWG-RA were established to deal with specific issues. The Chinese delegates paid 
much attention to exploring possible fields for cooperation. Through discussions, the 
group members strongly felt that the general political situation in the South China Sea 
area was much more stable and conducive for promoting cooperative efforts.174 Thus, the 
workshop agreed to establish more Technical Working Groups. They were TWG on 
Marine Environmental Protection (TWG-MEP) and TWG on Legal Matters (TWG-LM). 
China even showed great interest in hosting the working group on environmental 
issues.175 The issue of protecting the safety of navigation, shipping and communications 
were also touched during the meeting.  
 
The Fourth Workshop, however, saw the last of political and security talks on territorial 
and sovereignty issues. China demanded for several times the exclusion of political and 
territorial issues from the workshop. From China’s position, the South China Sea 
indisputably belonged to China. Accordingly, any discussion of territorial disputes was 
meaningless. On the other hand, the participants, since the beginning of the workshop, 
                                                 
172 M. Singgih Hadipranowo, et al., The Third Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea (Jakarta: Research and Development Agency, Department Of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, 1992), 
131-150, as reprinted in Lee Lai To, China and South China Sea Dialogues, 65. 
173 Report of The Third Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia, June 29–July 2, 1992, Annex F: Workshop Statement, 72. 
174 The Statement of the Fourth Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, 
Surabaya, Indonesia on August 23-25, 1993. 
175 M. Singgih Hadipranowo, et al., The Fourth Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea (Jakarta: Research and Development Agency, Department Of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, 1993), 
76. 
 76
had been given the equal rights for expressing their claims of the territory in the region 
without entering into a discussion. However, little progress had been made. As a 
consequence, the agenda of political and security talk seemed to come to the end. 
 
Since the Fifth Workshop, which was held in Bukittinggi in October 1994, the 
discussions of political and security issues have been excluded from the agenda. During 
the meeting, the participants expressed that they felt discussions on these issues were 
sterile. No disputant showed its willingness to compromise with the others on territorial 
disputes. Any discussion on sovereignty and jurisdictional issues was considered the 
waste of time and eliminated from the workshop agenda. As a result, the discussions on 
political and security issues in the South China Sea have been terminated since the fifth 
meeting. 
 
In accordance with China’s strategy, the workshop, which aimed at establishing 
cooperative mechanisms, had increasingly concentrated on the relatively non-
controversial technical-scientific aspects of the South China Sea issues. From China’s 
perspective, the progress of TWGs was quite helpful in exchanging information between 
the participants.176 The meeting approved to establish a program on the study and 
conservation of biodiversity in the South China Sea. The fourth TWG-MSR meeting 
agreed to convene in the following year to further their efforts on the monitoring of sea 
levels and tides. The meeting also reached an agreement on convening the first TWG-LM 
meeting in 1995. However, the TWG-LM would avoid the discussion on sensitive 
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territorial and sovereignty claims.177 During the workshop, “doughnut formula” was 
initiated by Indonesia to specify the place for joint development. The formula selected the 
hole in the doughnut, which was the middle of the South China Sea, as the right place for 
joint development. As China claimed the whole of the South China Sea region, it was 
afraid that the formula would restrict its claims into the middle of the area while leaving 
the elongated ring to its respective adjacent claimants. In order to prevent the technical 
sideline from developing into the political boundary, China expressed its opposition to 
the formula. Consequently, the “doughnut formula” was ignored in the workshop.178 
 
The Sixth Workshop was held in Balikpapan in October 1995. China again argued that 
the political and security discussions on the territorial disputes should not be included in 
the workshop.179 The meeting also “reiterated that nothing in the Workshop or any related 
meetings prejudiced or affected territorial or jurisdictional claims or positions in the 
South China Sea”.180 As the political and security issues have been excluded from the 
agenda, the workshop had been widely criticized as functioning more like a talk-shop. 
However, Ali Alatas had a different opinion. He expressed his satisfaction with the 
progress on the technical cooperative projects. He stated during the opening speech that 
the workshop “has formulated specific forms of cooperation and concrete projects in 
which all parties could participate… the various Technical Working Groups established 
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by the Workshop continue to make progress in studying various aspects of the projected 
cooperative efforts”.181  
 
Based on established TWGs, Indonesian delegates urged that the participants should 
consider the implementation of TWGs seriously. The idea was opposed by China. 
Although China strongly supported technical projects for joint development, the process 
of projects should be under China’s control. As China had not prepared well enough for 
carrying out the agreed proposal, it preferred to slow down the progress.182 China could 
control the pace of progress by opposing any initiative that did not meet with its intent. 
 
The Seventh Workshop was held in Batam in December 1996. The main task of this 
meeting was to discuss the implementation of the specific cooperative projects. Ali 
Alatas expressed his willingness that “the cooperative project proposals which the 
workshop has approved will soon be implemented with the full support of the authorities 
concerned”.183 In contrast to the participants who were mostly ready for implementation, 
China still hesitated.184 As China claimed the whole region, it was quite cautious to 
implement any proposal. A careless move could result disadvantage position as far as 
territorial claims were concerned. As a result, the implementation of the projects was 
postponed.  
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Although the implementation was suspended, more TWGs meetings were scheduled to 
convene during the workshop. The participants agreed to start the second TWG-LM and 
also proposed to establish the Group Experts Meetings (GEMs). The GEMs would cover 
the areas of marine environmental protection (GEM-MEP), education and training of 
mariners (GEM-ETM), and hydrographic data and information exchange (GEM-HDI). 
China was also authorized to host the second meeting of TWG-MEP in the following 
year. 
 
The Eighth Workshop was held in Puncak in December 1997. The meeting summarized 
the progress made by the numerous TWGs and GEMs in the previous years. The review 
was followed by the proposals of more TWGs and GEMs held in the next year. The third 
TWG meetings on both SNSC and LM were put on the agenda. Meanwhile, more GEMs 
were agreed to convene on HDI, MSR, and MEP. A new GEM on Non-Living and Non-
Hydrocarbon Resources (GEM-NHM) was also on the discussion list. Furthermore, the 
meeting agreed to establish a Study Group (SG) on Zones Of Cooperation (SG-ZOC).185 
 
The Ninth Workshop was held in Jakarta in December 1998. Ali Alatas opened the 
meeting by reemphasizing the importance of implementing the specific projects agreed 
by the participants.186 According to the decisions made by the workshop, more GEMs 
were convened on law enforcement and unlawful acts at sea (GEM-LEUAS) and 
environmental legislation (GEM-EL). The other TWGs, GEMs, and SGs continued with 
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their consecutive meetings. The ninth meeting also agreed to establish a group on the 
issue of a training program in biodiversity to initiate activities and compile geo-science 
data on the South China Sea. Besides, the participants agreed to recommend to their 
respective authorities to consider the ratification of: (1) the Rome Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988; (2) the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992; (3) the 
International Convention on the Establishment of International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992; and (4) the International Convention on Oil Spill 
Pollution and Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990.187 
 
The Tenth Workshop was held in Bogor, West Java in December 1999. China’s resource 
person recommended that urgent action should be taken about the degradation of the 
marine environment in the South China Sea. Thus, the consensus was made during the 
session that the protection of marine habitat deserved high priority.188 Meanwhile, the 
participants agreed to request again that their respective authorities specify or quantify 
their stated support and contribution for the implementation of the agreed projects and 
programs. At the end of the meeting, group members agreed that the Eleventh Workshop, 
together with the numerous technical meetings, should be held in 2000. 
 
However, the next workshop did not take place as scheduled because the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) discontinued its support for the workshop 
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process. The workshop resumed in Jakarta in 2001. The focal point of the meeting was to 
talk about the funding of the workshops. Meanwhile, the direction of workshop and how 
to carry out the cooperative projects were also widely discussed among the participants. 
China maintained its enthusiasm for the workshop and supported the role of the 
workshop in promoting joint developments between the territorial disputants. As per the 
members’ wishes, the workshop has continued its annual meetings since 2001. 
 
       3.2   EXCLUSION OF EXTERNAL ACTORS TO ADVISORY ROLES  
 
In order to balance China’s power in the workshop, ASEAN had considered inviting 
distant powers to the meeting. Consequently, they raised the discussion of involving 
major non-South China Sea powers in the region at the Second Workshop.189 From 
China’s perspective, it enjoyed its “great power” status within the mechanism and did not 
want to be checked by the others, especially the United States and Japan.190 The inclusion 
of outside powers would complicate the situation and would be adverse to China’s 
national interests. Because of China’s opposition, the proposal of inviting non-regional 
actors was not echoed within the meeting. Thus, the discussion has to be postponed 
nominally. 
 
However, some members felt great pressure during the discussion and policymaking 
process in the face of China’s “great power” status within the workshop. In response, 
they were eager for non-regional states to balance China’s power. Accordingly, the idea 
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of inviting outsiders was initiated again at the Fourth Workshop. Quite naturally, China 
rejected the idea.191 In order to show China’s image as a benign power, it did, however, 
make a concession and allowed the involvement of non-South China Sea states and other 
regional or global organizations in future workshops. Following this, the agreement of 
involving non-regional actors was reached by the participants at the meeting.192 
Nevertheless, as the agreement was against China’s initial strategy,193 it would be quite 
difficult to be put on the agenda for implementation. According to the agreement, the 
participation of non-regional actors should be allowed on a case-by-case basis.194 The 
approval of each case should be based on a general consensus within the group. If China 
believed that the involvement of distant power would balance China’s power within the 
workshop, the agreement could not be reached. As a result, the agreement could only be 
considered as a symbolic achievement since it would be silenced at the workshop as per 
China’s wishes. The actual implementation could only be expected when China realized 
that it was not at the expense of China’s interest. 
 
As the Fourth Workshop had approved the proposal of involving non-South China Sea 
actors, the Fifth Workshop went further to authorize Dr. Djalal to seek cooperation with 
states outside the region.195 Ali Alatas, from Indonesian Foreign Ministry, initiated the 
idea during the meeting. He iterated the possibility of inviting the United States, Japan, 
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and Europe to assist in cooperative projects.196 In order to allow for gradual and 
manageable progress, Ali Alatas emphasized that such involvement could be only on the 
technical or financial aspects at the early stage. The proposal encountered major 
objection from China. China’s delegates maintained, “It is not the time for us to involve 
them as we are just at the stage of discussing cooperation amongst ourselves”.197 
However, China’s statement was not unshakeable. China agreed that the issue of 
broadening the group could be considered when the time was right in the future.198 
 
Backed by the authority given by the Fifth Workshop, Hasjim Djalal started seeking 
support and funding beyond the region. At the Ninth Workshop, the decision was made to 
invite a representative from United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).199 The 
officer was asked to give a presentation on the issues of the East Asian Seas Regional 
Coordinating Unit. Without doubt, the decision challenged China’s strategy within the 
workshop, a move received very poorly by China. China showed great reluctance at the 
invitation of UNEP officer and warned, “No one has the right to extend the resource 
persons to outsiders without the agreement from the participants of the Workshop. UNEP 
is an organ of the United Nations; and therefore it should not have any formal 
relationship with this Workshop”.200 In spite of this, China conceded by agreeing that  
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Dr. Djalal and Professor Townsend-Gault could continue communicating with UNEP 
regarding the implementation of some components of the Biodiversity Project that could 
be included within UNEP's Strategic Action Program.201 According to the agreement, 
UNEP had been invited to annual workshops ever since.  
 
However, it was still hard to say how much UNEP could be involved in the 
implementation of the specific projects. During the following series of workshops, no 
significant progress had been made on this issue.202 China’s position was very clear that 
the South China Sea disputes should be resolved among the countries concerned. 
Although the regional or international organizations might be more acceptable to China 
than states such as the United States and Japan, China had agreed to talk rather than to 
take any real action with the outsiders on cooperative projects. China’s voice was echoed 
by some littoral states in the region. They were afraid that involvement of non-regional 
actors would complicate the issue and the distant powers could use the involvement as 
the pretext for interfering in regional affairs. As a result, there would be more contention 
when the cooperation with non-regional actors comes to the stage of implementation.  
 
Since the CIDA withdrew its contribution, the workshop discontinued its annual meeting 
in 2000. Although a number of countries showed their willingness to give financial 
support to the workshop, the members decided to fund themselves. The major concern 
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Environmental Protection in the South China Sea, Manila, November 25-28, 1998. 
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was that the external funding would come with political strings attached.203 It also 
implied that China’s preference of excluding non-regional players was acceptable to most, 
maybe not all, workshop members. 
 
As a consequence, what can be expected is that multilateral workshop would continue to 
be undertaken exclusively by the South China Sea states. China would maintain its “great 
power” status within the multilateral mechanism in the foreseeable future. The outcome 
would be different if China had realized that distant players could be helpful in building 
up the regional order by assisting in the joint developments. 
 
       3.3   INFORMALITY 
 
To prevent the workshop from evolving into a formal forum was not a substantial 
strategy of China’s multilateralism in the region. Since 1995, China has agreed to talk 
about the South China Sea issue with ASEAN at the ASEAN Regional Forum that is a 
formal multilateral mechanism. It seemed that formal multilateral talk on this issue was 
acceptable to China. The major reason for China’s opposition to the formalization was 
Taiwan’s participation. The MPCSCS Workshop was the only multilateral forum in the 
region that involved both the PRC and Taiwan on the South China Sea issue.204 As China 
insisted on “One China” policy, it could not allow Taiwan to be present in a formal talk. 
As a result, two choices emerged for China. One was to accept the proposal of 
                                                 
203 Karsten Von Hoesslin, Informal Dialogue on the South China Sea Works to Singapore’s Advantage: 
Annual Workshop on Preventing Conflict as Strong as Ever [cited July 20, 2005], available from: 
http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/publications/pdf/vonhoesslin-straits_jan05.pdf. 
204 Taiwan was excluded from ASEAN, ARF and CSCAP that deals with the South China Sea conflicts in 
the region. 
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formalization while preventing Taiwan from participating. The other was to allow the 
presence of Taiwan but keep the informal nature of the workshop. As both the PRC and 
Taiwan were invited by the workshop and the PRC was eager to publicize its joint 
development idea within the multilateral forum, the latter choice floated as the better 
strategy for China. As the consequence, any initiation of formalizing the workshop was 
objected by China during the series of meetings. 
 
Since 1990, China had stated that the workshop should not be formalized.205As the 
workshop promised its informal nature, China has attended the meeting actively since the 
Second Workshop. This unofficial, or second track, workshop was embraced by China 
because the working group was totally independent and did not support any particular 
jurisdictional claim in the disputed region. However, the second meeting saw the 
discussion on the need to establish a secretariat and formalize the workshop. This 
proposal encountered many obstacles, mainly from China.206 China prevented Taiwan 
from entering into any kind of formal organization. Due to the need to invite both China 
and Taiwan to the same forum, the workshop had to remain informal. Otherwise, the 
whole agenda of the meeting would be occupied by the discussion of Taiwan’s status. 
What was worse, Taiwan and China would withdraw from the meeting. Without 
involving the main claimants in the South China Sea, the workshop would be 
meaningless. Thus, the idea of formalization was ignored. 
 
                                                 
205 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Reports: East Asia (August 13, 1990), 36; New Straits 
Times, August 13, 1990; Nayan Chanda and Tai Ming Cheung, “Reef Knots,” Far Eastern Economic 
Review (August 30, 1990), 8. 
206 Considering the issue of inviting non regional power and formalizing the workshop, not only China, but 
also some of the other participants expressed their objections for respective reasons. 
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The issue of formalization was again raised during the Third workshop. As expected, this 
was opposed by many participants, especially China.207 However, the Fourth Workshop 
saw another initiation of the formalization. Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas expressed 
his desire to formalize the workshop as an official inter-governmental forum in his 
opening speech.208 The response of Chinese delegates was “No Way! No Way! We 
definitely disagree. The matter is very complicated. If the proceeding were formalized, 
the issue would become very difficult”.209 China had been quite satisfied with the status 
of the participants then and supported the informal nature of the workshop. From China’s 
perspective, there was no necessity for the workshop to evolve into a formal forum.210 
Meanwhile, some ASEAN diplomats also privately accused Indonesia of upsetting China 
by formalizing the workshop.211 Contended by the objections mainly from China, Dr. 
Djalal had no choice but slow down the process of formalization. In search of the 
possibility of formalization in the future, Dr. Djalal asked the participants to recommend 
the proposals to their respective governments.212 
 
Since the Fifth Workshop, the efforts of formalizing the meeting have been focused on 
technical cooperative projects. Ali Alatas presented the idea in his opening address. He 
explained that it was not mature to “raise the whole workshop process to be a formal 
                                                 
207 Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: Informal 
Diplomacy for Conflict Prevention”, 119; The Straits Times, July 3, 1992. 
208 M. Singgih Hadipranowo, et al., The Fourth Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea, 72; Ian Kemish, “Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea”, 225 
209 United Daily News, August 25, 1993, 9. 
210 The Straits Times, August 24, 1993; Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore), August 26, 1993; AP-DJ, August 24, 
1993. 
211 “Southeast Asia—Divide and Rule: Beijing Scores Points on South China Sea,” Far Eastern Economic 
Review, August 11, 1994, 18. 
212 M. Singgih Hadipranowo, et al., The Fourth Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea, 35. 
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meeting among governments. But since we have agreed that there can be cooperation in 
areas, it is necessary to follow through with the involvement of government departments, 
so that cooperation can be concrete”.213 The clarification was considered as a sign that 
ASEAN countries had to slow down the process of formalization in order to reach a 
compromise with China.214 
 
In 1995, China agreed that the South China Sea conflicts could be discussed in the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the formal multilateral mechanism. As a result, the 
participants of the Sixth Workshop did not see any need to formalize the workshop.215 As 
the issues had been discussed in a more formal forum, Ali Alatas reiterated in the Seventh 
Workshop that the workshop was informal and there was no need to pursue the issue.216 
During the Eighth Workshop, he made a further clarification and finalized the workshop 
as the informal talk that provided basic support to the formal forum on the South China 
Sea issues.217 
 
The idea of formalization was ignored in the workshops. In order to prevent Taiwan from 
gaining the equal status with the other states, China had to keep the workshop informal. 
What was more, China’s delegation found that it was more comfortable to participate in 
an informal talk rather than a formal one, although the formal one was also acceptable. 
The informal workshop gave China an opportunity to exchange information, 
                                                 
213 The Straits Times, October 22, 1994, October 26, 1994. 
214 Lee Lai To, China and South China Sea Dialogues, 71. 
215 During the sixth workshop, China reiterated that the issue of formality could not be discussed within the 
meeting. See The Straits Times, October 13, 1995. 
216 The Straits Times, December 16, 1996. 
217 The Straits Times, December 4, 1997. 
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communicate, and negotiate with the other claimants in a free atmosphere. At the 
informal meeting, China could control the pace of process in China’s favor. China could 
fulfill its commitments only when it had prepared well enough. Out of the similar 
considerations, China’s opposition to the formalization was echoed by some ASEAN 
countries. In light of the discussion of South China Sea disputes within the ARF, any 
attempt of formalizing the workshop was considered unnecessary. 
 
By reviewing China’s multilateral policy in the MPCSCS Workshops from 1992 to 2001, 
I can conclude that China showed its intention by dominating the process of this 
multilateral mechanism and redirecting the meetings to China’s favored track. The 
workshops bear the mark of Chinese requirements.  
 
At China’s request, any sovereignty and jurisdictional discussion about the territorial 
disputes had been set aside since the Fifth Workshop. Gradually recognizing the 
meaninglessness of political and security discussion, ASEAN countries began to 
emphasize the importance of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).218 Starting from 
the similar concerns with the informality of the workshop, China did not want to discuss 
the political CBMs in the workshop that included Taiwan. China’s entry into the CBMs 
talk at the ARF proved that the political CBMs were acceptable to China even within the 
formal multilateral mechanism.219 Echoed by some of the other participants, China 
                                                 
218 The issue of CBMs had been touched since the Fourth Workshop. Participants agreed to talk about the 
CBMs in the final session of the meeting. See the Statement of the Fourth Workshop on Managing 
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Surabaya, Indonesia on 23-25 August 1993. 
219 Taiwan was not the ARF member. 
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expressed its reluctance for talking about CBMs in such an informal workshop.220 
Accordingly, the interests of promoting CBMs in the workshop had been reduced. In the 
eighth workshop, the issue of the CBMs was not discussed because of the time 
constraints. This tells that the issue was not essential in the workshop, though touched 
upon in the following workshops, where no significant progress had been made. 
 
While shelving the territorial disputes, the workshop redefined its focal point on 
promoting the technical cooperative projects for joint development. The programs 
covered mainly five areas. They were Marine Scientific Research, Safety of Navigation 
and Communications, Resource Assessment and Ways of Development, Legal Matters, 
and Marine Environmental Protection. Numerous meetings on these matters had taken 
place under the support of the workshop (See Table 3.1). Some of them had been close to 
implementation. However, the timetable of carrying out the implementations was, to a 
large extent, decided by China.  
 
Table 3.1   A list of Previous TWG, GEM, SG, and Other Meetings Held  
between 1993-2000 
 
1993 TWG-MSR-1 Manila, Philippines 
  TWG-MSR-2 Surabaya, Indonesia 
  TWG-RA-1 Jakarta, Indonesia 
1994 TWG-MSR-3 Singapore 
  TWG-MEP-1 Hangzhou, China 
1995 TWG-MSR-4 Hanoi, Vietnam 
 TWG-SNSC-1 Jakarta, Indonesia 
 TWG-LM-1 Phuket, Thailand 
1996 TWG-MSR-5 Cebu, Philippines 
 TWG-SNSC-2 Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei 
                                                 
220 The Straits Times, October 13, 1995. 
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1997 TWG-MEP-2 Hainan, China 
 TWG-LM-2 Chiang Mai, Thailand 
 GEM-MEP-1 Phnom Penh, Cambodia 
 GEM-ETM-1 Singapore 
 GEM-HDI-1 Kuching, Malaysia 
1998 TWG-SNSC-3 Singapore 
 TWG-LM-3 Pattaya, Thailand 
 GEM-HDI-2 Singapore 
 TWG-MSR-6 Manila, Philippines 
 GEM-MEP-2 Manila, Philippines 
 GEM-NHM-1 Jakarta, Indonesia 
 SG-ZOC-1 Vientiane, Laos 
1999 SG-ZOC-2 Tabanan, Bali, Indonesia 
 GEM-EL-1 Shanghai, China 
 TWG-LM-4 Koh Samui, Thailand 
 GEM-SRIAS-1 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia 
2000 GEM-HDI-3 Legian, Bali, Indonesia 
 GEM-SRIAS -2  
 SG-ZOC-3  
 GEM-EL-2  
 GEM-NHM-2  
 TWG-LM-5 Cha Am, Thailand  
 
Source: compiled by the author 
Keys: TWG=Technical Working Group; GEM=Group of Experts Meeting; SG=Study Group; MSR= 
Marine Scientific Research; RA=Resource Assessment; MEP= Marine Environmental Protection; SNSC= 
Safety of Navigation, Shipping and Communication; LM= Legal Matters; ETM= Education and Training 
of Mariners; HDI= Hydrographic Data and Information Exchange; NHM= Non-living, Non-hydrocarbon 
Mineral Resources; ZOC= Zones of Co-operation; EL=Environmental Legislation; SRIAS=Search and 
Rescue and Illegal Acts at Sea 
 
Besides, the issues of inviting non-South China Sea actors and formalizing the workshop 
were ignored at the meetings. By preventing outside powers from interfering on the 
regional affairs, China could enjoy its “great power” status within the workshop. It was 
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not difficult for China to oppose any adversarial initiative from the meeting. Only 
China’s preferred idea could be agreed as a consensus at the meetings.  
 
Although the agenda of the workshop had been labeled with China’s strategy in the 
region, it was still acceptable to the other disputants. One idea of ASEAN was that “Talk 
talk is better than shoot shoot.”221 The ASEAN approach in the workshop was non-
confrontational.222 In face of China’s strong stance, ASEAN countries had to avoid direct 
confrontation with China and seek possible space for compromise. The areas of 
consensus building were in China’s terms. Although the progress was quite slow, 
ASEAN members realized that it was the only way to keep the workshop working. 
 
As China was quite satisfied with the progress of the workshop, it reaffirmed its embrace 
of regional multilateralism. China expressed that “it is necessary to strengthen 
multilateral consultations and to adopt adequate Confidence Building Measures within 
the frame of preventive diplomacy with a view to promote the mutual understanding and 
security cooperation among the Asia Pacific countries”.223 China showed its support and 
participated in the MPCSCS Workshop actively with the hope that its strategy of joint 
development could be reached finally.224 The workshop would continue to be considered 
as a good instrument for publicizing its regional order and finally building up China’s 
hegemonic stability in the South China Sea area. 
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Sea, 88. 
224 Wang Xinsheng, Sino-Southeast Asian Regional Cooperation and Public Administration, 162. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
CASE STUDY: 
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM 
 
 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was the first high-ranking multilateral mechanism 
on political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The forum involved most 
of the countries in this region. The annual ARF meetings brought together Foreign 
Ministers from ten ASEAN nations and their counterparts from Australia, Canada, China, 
the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Russia and the United States. North Korea and East Timor were invited as 
well.225 
 
Since the first meeting, the ARF had taken an evolutionary approach extended over three 
broad stages, namely the promotion of confidence building, the development of 
preventive diplomacy, and the elaboration of approaches to conflicts.226 During the first 
stage, no institutionalization was expected. The meeting was considered as a milestone 
                                                 
225 The first ARF meeting was attended by 6 ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), 7 ASEAN’s dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, the European 
Union, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United States), 2 ASEAN’s Consultative Partners (China 
and Russia), and three ASEAN’s Observers (Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam). India became a 
participant on becoming a dialogue partner in 1996. Mongolia, North Korea, and East Timor were admitted 
in 1999, 2000, and 2005 respectively.  
226 The concept of three-stage evolution was clarified in the second ARF meeting. See ASEAN Secretariat, 
“Chairman’s Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum,” ASEAN Regional Forum: Documents 
Series 1994 – 2002. (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2003), 10. 
 94
for the region, which “signified the opening of a new chapter of peace, stability and 
cooperation for Southeast Asia”.227 
 
The ARF built upon the ASEAN’s idea and was in accordance with the 1992 Singapore 
Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit. The main concern of ASEAN during the 
ARF’s establishment was how to react to the potential power shifts in the region.228 Due 
to the U.S. military withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the other regional powers, 
especially China, were eager to fill in the power vacuum or challenge the primary role of 
the United States in the region. Thus, ASEAN hoped that the multilateral framework 
could help to preserve the stable regional environment that had fostered ASEAN’s 
dramatic economic growth. Meanwhile, by leading the forum, ASEAN wished to expand 
its influence from the sub-region to the whole Asia-Pacific area.229 Despite this, 
ASEAN’s primary security concern was still regional stability, especially in face of the 
unpredictable role of a rising China. Accordingly, ASEAN’s China strategy was to 
enmesh China into a web of relationships and cultivate it to be a responsible regional 
power through the ARF framework.230 By restraining China’s behavior through a formal 
                                                 
227 ASEAN Secretariat, “Chairman’s Statement of the First ASEAN Regional Forum,” ASEAN Regional 
Forum: Documents Series 1994 – 2002, 3. 
228 Maria Consuelo C. Ortuoste, “Reviewing the ARF and its Role in Southeast Asian Security,” Paper 
presented in the International Workshop on New Dimensions of Conflict and Challenges for Conflict 
Management in Southeast Asia, December 5-9, 1999, Penang, Malaysia. 
229 Ian Stewart,  “ASEAN Displays New Influence in Move to Host Regional Forum,” South China 
Morning Post, July 26, 1993. 
230 Jusuf Wanandi, “ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 3 
(Autumn 1996), 121. 
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multilateral mechanism, the South China Sea conflict could be resolved in ASEAN’s 
favor.231 
 
From China’s perspective, however, the focal point of security concern in the Asia-
Pacific region was not located in Southeast Asia but Northeast Asia. The South China 
Sea disputes did not rank higher than the relations across the Taiwan Straits, the bilateral 
security agreement between the United States and Japan, or even the nuclear crisis in the 
Korean Peninsula. Thus, China’s purpose of entering into the ARF stemmed from its 
concern of not only the South China Sea but also the whole Asia-Pacific region. It was a 
move to build up a harmonious external environment, to seek opportunities for its 
modernization drive, and to expand its influence in the entire Asia-Pacific region. 
 
This study, however, intends to discuss China’s concession of allowing the inclusion of 
the South China Sea issue on the formal multilateral discussion of the ARF. China’s main 
intention behind this concession was to maintain regional stability.232 Meanwhile, the 
multilateral talks could be used to help establish a regional order of “Sovereignty is mine, 
postpone disputes, exploit the resources for mutual benefit”. Departing from these 
concerns, China’s strategies were: 1) to express China’s stance and defend its territorial 
claims over the region; 2) to prevent the discussion of political and security issues on the 
South China Sea within the ARF meeting; 3) to welcome the cooperative efforts in 
promoting joint developments between the territorial disputants; and 4) to forestall any 
                                                 
231 The unstated objective of the ARF was to engage China in a security dialogue, so the threat posed by 
Beijing's military power can be contained. See “ASEAN—Gentle Giant: China Seeks to Calm Southeast 
Asia’s Fears,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 4, 1994. 
232 “China For ASEAN Security Forum if Members Agree on Stabilising Role,” The Straits Times, May 22, 
1994. 
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attempt by the outsiders, especially the United States and Japan, to intervene in regional 
affairs.  
 
China’s engagement in the ARF dated back to China’s then Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen’s visit in Singapore in July 1993. During the trip, he assured his Singaporean 
counterpart that “China would be pleased to participate in regional security dialogues 
with ASEAN” and accepted the invitation of joining the ARF.233 Qian, quoted by his 
spokesman Wu Jianmin, further explained, “China is ready to conduct dialogues at 
different levels, through different channels and in whatever forms”. Considering the 
multilateral talk on the South China Sea conflicts, Qian restated China’s indisputable 
claims over the islands and supported the idea of putting the sovereignty question aside 
temporarily to allow for joint development.234 
 
The First ARF meeting was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994, China participating as a 
consultative partner. The forum provided an opportunity for the regional states to 
exchange their ideas about the Asia-Pacific area in particular and also international 
relations and defense affairs in general. The meeting agreed to accept the purpose and 
principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as a code of 
conduct governing their relations. 
 
In preparation for the First ARF, some of the ASEAN members called for the forum to 
focus on the common areas rather than contentious issues since “raising contentious 
                                                 
233 “ASEAN Discuss Setting Up of New Regional Security Forum,” BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 
July 24, 1993. 
234 “China’s Policy in Asia-Pacific Is One of Peace: Qian,” The Straits Times, July 24, 1993. 
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issues at the meeting might put certain countries on the defensive if they were at the end 
of the criticisms and cause them to question their participation in the forum”.235 The idea 
was welcomed by China, as it would be quite embarrassing if the disputes over the 
sovereignty of the South China Sea were included in the agenda of the forum.236  
 
However, ASEAN members, especially Malaysia and the Philippines, did show their 
interest in discussing the political and security issues of the South China Sea conflicts 
during the inaugural meeting.237 In response, the Chinese delegate, in the first press 
conference prior to the ARF meeting, restated that territorial disputes should not be 
touched during the ARF talks.238 In order not to confront China during the inaugural 
meeting, ASEAN delegates refrained from raising such sensitive issues.239 A senior 
ASEAN official summed up the situation with the following lines, “Let's face it. China is 
too big and powerful. If it says it won't accept the multilateral approach there is no point 
pushing that… Everybody is reluctant to say anything that upsets the Chinese. The fact is, 
China has won”.240  
 
In the end, there was no fixed agenda on this issue for the three-hour meeting. The 
statement highlighted the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 
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Northeast Asia, while leaving the South China Sea conflicts unmentioned. As the first 
meeting failed to address pressing issues such as the jurisdictional stalemate in the South 
China Sea, the ARF was criticized as being in danger of becoming “no more than a 
glorified cocktail party”.241 
 
Through the habit of dialogue in the ARF, China was slowly seeing the merits of a formal 
multilateral approach. As ASEAN undertook the obligation to be the primary driving 
force, the method and approach of the ARF followed ASEAN’s diplomatic practice. Soon 
after the First ARF meeting, it was reported that China was satisfied with ASEAN’s role 
as the chairman of the forum and was willing to rule out the use of force or threat to settle 
the South China Sea disputes. China further expressed its hope of adopting a principle of 
cooperation on regional security at the Second ARF meeting.242 
 
The Mischief Reef incident, however, broke out in 1995. As the Philippines could not 
balance China’s power within the bilateral talks, its immediate strategy was to formalize 
the talks and internationalize the conflicts.243 President Fidel Ramos stated that the 
Mischief Reef incident was not only a bilateral issue between China and the Philippines 
but also a multilateral concern to “all countries interested in the long-term stability of the 
South China Sea and the East Asian region as a whole”. Besides, the Philippines even 
considered taking the case to the International Court of Justice in the Hague.244 
 
                                                 
241 The Straits Times, 2 August 1995; Robert A. Manning and Jame J. Przystup, “The China Challenge,” 
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However, ASEAN members each had individual interests vested in China and not all 
ASEAN countries claimed islands in the South China Sea. With the ASEAN allies 
incapable of presenting strong protest, Manila could do little but encourage a collective 
effort in “quiet diplomacy” to convince the Chinese to adhere to the Manila 
Declaration.245 However, Philippines’ proposal of raising the dispute over the Spratlys 
with China during the Second ARF meeting in August that year was rejected by its 
ASEAN co-members. As ASEAN calculated the priority of using the ARF was to engage 
China rather than to confront it, the group decided to refrain from raising territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea collectively but encouraged individual states to put up 
the issue.246 
 
In response to the escalating tensions over Mischief Reef and the Philippines’ demands, 
both Japan and the United States were concerned that the conflict would threaten the free 
passage of shipping in the region. The United States presented its stance on this issue by 
stating that maintaining peace, stability, and freedom of navigation was the major interest 
of the United States. It also declared that it would maintain its neutral position on the 
legal merits of the competing claims.247 However, it called for the discussion of South 
China Sea issues at the next ARF meeting.248  
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Although the United States promised to take no position on the territorial disputes, its 
regular naval presence in the South China Sea helped serve as deterrence to any unilateral 
action in the region. In order to prevent outside powers from interfering directly in the 
issue, China agreed to a code of conduct with the Philippines that both two parties were 
bound to resolve disputes “without prejudice to the freedom of navigation in the South 
China Sea”.249 Furthermore, as China’s fear of being controlled by outside powers was 
identical to ASEAN’s concern, the likelihood was slim that direct U.S. intervention 
would be accepted in resolving the South China Sea conflicts at the coming ARF 
meeting.250  
 
On the other hand, China had to deal with the possible collective protest from ASEAN 
nations. Considering the importance of cultivating beneficial economic and political ties 
with the Southeast Asia, China realized that it was time to discuss the South China Sea 
conflict at the ARF meeting. By attending the ARF senior officials meeting in Brunei, 
Assistant Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yinfan explained, “Beijing's position had not 
changed -- it continues to claim all of the Spratlys but welcomes joint development of the 
islands.”251 China, on the eve of the ARF meeting, reiterated that it had agreed to settle its 
dispute with Asian neighbors over the Spratly Islands, on the basis of international law 
without the involvement from outsiders.252 
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The Second ARF did provide a platform for the members to discuss the issue openly. 
During the meeting, China, for the first time in a formal multilateral function, agreed to 
discuss the South China Sea disputes with ASEAN as a group. China was among the first 
to raise the South China Sea territorial dispute. It reemphasized its indisputable 
ownership of the South China Sea area.253 Yet China agreed to act in accordance with 
international law, including the Law of the Sea, in its effort to resolve the regional 
dispute. China’s standing committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress also 
planned to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.254 Up to this time, China 
believed that the most realistic and practical way to resolve the Spratly dispute was to 
“shelve disputes and facilitate joint development”.255 In order to assure the United States 
and prevent it from intervening in regional affairs, China also promised to keep the 
navigation free in the region.256 A series of conciliatory moves could be meaningful to 
repair the damage of Sino-ASEAN relations.257 
 
China’s concession was considered an ARF success, because China was induced to the 
formal multilateral discussion table on the South China Sea issues.258 However, “there 
were no initiatives to take serious action within the ARF framework.259 Because of 
China’s sensitivities, the ministers had agreed not to mention the South China Sea 
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conflicts openly in the statement,260 but expressed their concern on overlapping 
sovereignty claims in the region and encouraged all the disputants to “reaffirm their 
commitment to the principles contained in relevant international laws and convention, 
and the ASEAN’s 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea”.261  
 
Besides the South China Sea discussion, the Second ARF elaborated that “decisions of 
the ARF shall be made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations 
among all participants”.262 It served China’s interest in resolving the South China Sea 
conflicts. By opposing any adversarial initiation, the process of conflict resolution could 
move at a pace comfortable to China. Thus, China showed its support to ASEAN as the 
chairman of the ARF.263 
 
The forum also agreed to establish three inter-sessional working groups, which shall be 
co-chaired by ASEAN and non-ASEAN participants. One was Inter-sessional Support 
Group (ISG) on Confidence Building specializing on security perceptions and defense 
policy papers. The other two were Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) on Cooperative 
Activities including, inter alia, Peacekeeping.264 The South China Sea issue had been 
allowed for discussion since the second meeting of ISG on CBMs in 1997. 
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The Third forum was held in Jakarta in July 1996. It was the first time that China 
attended the ARF meeting as a full dialogue partner of ASEAN. The major issue 
concerning the South China Sea conflicts during the forum was ASEAN’s request for 
China’s explanation about the recently released decree that defined its territorial borders 
in the South China Sea. 
 
Earlier that year, China assured the other disputants that by acceding to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China would, just like other countries, 
interpret these laws in such a way as to maximize its claims in the region.265 According to 
China’s interpretation of the UNCLOS, China promulgated a new law on its maritime 
boundaries and published a map over the South China Sea area. The actions were 
considered by its smaller neighbors as an indication that China was vastly expanding its 
sovereignty in the region.266 Consequently, ASEAN members were expected to express 
their displeasure over China's move during the Third ARF meeting.267 However, some of 
the ASEAN officials showed their concern of confronting China, as it had just become a 
full dialogue partner and suggested playing down their differences with China.268  
 
At the meeting, Chinese delegates continued to articulate the importance of maintaining 
regional peace and developing mutually beneficial cooperation with ASEAN as its 
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priority.269  During the various discussions on the South China Sea disputes, China 
defended its promulgation of the law as it was “in accordance with international law and 
Chinese domestic law”. As the differences of views between Chinese experts and experts 
from outside did exist, China hoped that they could “solve the differences through 
consultations”.270 The recommendation was accepted by the other rival claimants who 
agreed that they would “continue to talk on this.”271 Foreign Minister Qian Qichen further 
expressed, “China stands for shelving the disputes while going for joint development 
pending a solution… It is my hope that they will gradually become consensus views of 
Forum members”.272  
 
Starting from Indonesia’s concern that “they would be unable to take the matter 
significantly further”, the South China Sea issue got only a “passing mention” during the 
ARF meeting.273 By concluding the forum, the meeting, in a broad sense, encouraged the 
claimants to seek solutions by peaceful means in accordance with international law in 
general and with the UNCLOS of 1982 in particular.274 China’s new law, without doubt, 
had strengthened its claim on the disputed region, which is based on historical grounds. 
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As such, China’s multilateral maneuvers had been successful in strengthening its legal 
claims while appeasing the ASEAN members.  
 
During the meeting, China volunteered to co-host the second ISG on CBMs in Beijing in 
the following year. In accordance with the agreement, China shared with the Philippines 
leadership of a March ARF-ISG on CBMs in Beijing in 1997. During the ISG, the 
participants emphasized the importance of ensuring stability in the South China Sea 
region. The meeting encouraged the efforts for a peaceful solution to the disputes.275 The 
Philippines took this opportunity to raise a discussion on the Mischief Reef incident and 
also initiated the proposal to endorse a 1992 ASEAN document calling for peaceful 
resolution to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. However, ARF members’ 
attention had been drawn to the confidence-building exercises offered by China to visit 
the barracks of the PLA division. Thus, Philippines’ proposal received no active response 
from the ISG.276 
 
Philippines’ proposal again encountered obstacles later at the Fourth ARF meeting in July 
1997. A senior ASEAN official said there was hardly any discussion on the South China 
Sea issue. “It’s relatively bland, and it seems it’s not the flavor of the month.”277 The 
flavor of the month was the Cambodian leadership crisis, together with the human rights 
issue in Myanmar. Thus, without specific discussion over the territorial disputes, Foreign 
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Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in his chairman statement of the Fourth 
ARF, just touched the issue of the South China Sea conflicts and “welcomed the efforts 
by countries concerned to seek solutions by peaceful means in accordance with 
international law, the UNCLOS, and the exercise of self restraint, in the interest of 
maintaining peace and stability in the region”.278 In response, China's Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Cui Tiankai reiterated China’s stance of resolving the conflicts through 
peaceful consultations and asking for joint development with countries concerned.279 
 
The Fifth ARF meeting was held in Manila in July 1998. The nuclear tests by India and 
Pakistan in May took center stage at the meeting.280 Another issue was the East Asian 
Financial Crisis. From ASEAN’s perspective, China had changed its image from a 
threatening power to a rock of financial stability. China was widely praised for its 
steadfast commitment not to devalue its currency.281 
 
China reiterated its preference for the settlement of disputes, alluding to the South China 
Sea conflicts, with its neighboring countries through friendly consultation and 
negotiation.282 During the talks with the Philippines’ counterpart, China's Foreign 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan reaffirmed the claims of the region but also assured “that the 
Mischief Reef facilities are really only for weather purposes and that in an appropriate 
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time in the future, they will make these facilities available and also open to Philippine 
fishermen”.283 The forum expressed satisfaction on the positive contributions made by the 
bilateral consultations between the countries concerned and encouraged the continued 
exercise of self-restraint by all the countries concerned for the peaceful settlement of the 
dispute on the South China Sea. 284  
 
However, tension had been raised again as China expanded its structure on Mischief Reef 
in the Spratlys.285 China clarified that the structure was a fishermen’s shelter but the 
Philippines doubted it.286 Consequently, the Philippines immediate strategy was to get 
international support through the ARF and isolate China.287 However, its proposal did not 
receive much active response from the ASEAN member states. Malaysia's Foreign 
Minister Syed Hamid Albar, considering China’s repeated objections, expressed that 
“there is no instability in the area” and the issue would not be on the agenda of the ARF 
in Singapore in July 1999.288 Consistently, China opposed the internationalization of the 
regional disputes and stated, “The dispute over the Nansha (Spratly) islands should be 
resolved through peaceful means, between the relevant parties sitting together… China is 
not in favor of the intervention of other countries”.289  
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Besides, the Philippines proposed a draft on the Regional Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea to be discussed at the next Sixth ARF meeting. The draft, directly in response 
to tensions in the Mischief Reef, called for a pledge from the claimants to undertake no 
new construction or expansion of structures in the South China Sea. The draft of code 
was agreed by ASEAN officials to be presented at the ARF meeting, although Malaysia, 
which was suspected by its ASEAN members of having “cut a deal on the side with 
China over the Spratly islands”, had some reservations about the draft.290 However, 
China reacted coolly to the proposed code of conduct, considering the Sino-ASEAN 1997 
joint statement as the genuine, highest-level political code of conduct.291 In order to make 
the draft code more acceptable to China, Manila had to amend the code of conduct by 
allowing the construction of new permanent structures in the disputed islands.292 
 
The code of conduct was inevitably raised by the Philippines during the Sixth ARF 
meeting. Concerning the possible intervention by the major powers, such as the United 
States and Japan, China expressed its opposition to the discussion of the draft code. As 
the Philippines had shown its concession by amending the draft, China indicated that it 
was “prepared to discuss” the proposal.293 However, the ARF was not the ideal place for 
discussion. Instead, China would elaborate its position during the post-ministerial 
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conference session only between China and the ten ASEAN members.294 China’s opinion 
was echoed by some of the ASEAN countries that were irked when the United States 
raised the South China Sea issue during the meeting. The U.S. initiation was considered a 
direct violation of the wishes of ASEAN and China that the talks should only involve 
claimants but not outsiders.295 In the end, the ministers noted in the statement that “some 
ARF countries were concerned that there could be increased tensions”, alluded to the 
recent expansion of structure on the Mischief Reef, and that further discussion would be 
needed for completing the code of conduct in promoting peace in the South China Sea. 296 
 
The Seventh ARF meeting was held in Bangkok in July 2000. The issues related to the 
North Korea’s participation in the regional forum took the center-stage in the meeting, 
leaving the South China Sea dispute to be mentioned. 
 
China was quite uncomfortable when other countries tried to raise the issue of disputed 
islands in the South China Sea.297 China reaffirmed its stance that the tension was not 
being built in the region. China was also engaged in framing a common code of conduct 
with the other disputants aimed at preventing the escalation of tensions. “Notable 
progress has been made” and the code was expected to be signed by the end of 2000. 
Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan expressed his satisfaction with the easing of 
tensions in the area following efforts to establish a more frequent dialogue between the 
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claimants.298 As such, any initiation of the South China Sea dispute within the ARF, from 
China’s perspective, seemed inappropriate and should be rebuked. In the end, the forum 
expressed the willingness to exercise self-restraint by all countries concerned and the 
promotion of confidence building measures in the area, and welcomed their commitment 
to resolve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the recognized principles of 
international law, including the UNCLOS, as well as to ensuring the freedom of 
navigation in this area.299 
 
 The Eighth ASEAN Regional Forum was held in Hanoi in July 2001. Discussions on the 
code of conduct in the South China Sea, along with other Asia-Pacific security issues, 
occupied the center-stage of the meeting.300  
 
In preparation for the discussion of the code of conduct in the ARF meeting, the 
Philippines circulated a new draft of the code among the ASEAN members. The draft 
would cover the Spratly Islands but refused Vietnam’s demand for including the Paracel 
Islands that was physically controlled by China. In addition, the draft dropped any 
reference to geographic boundaries in a bid to make it more acceptable to the other 
disputants, especially China.301 
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During the meeting, China’s Foreign Minister reemphasized its priority of maintaining 
the surrounding environment of good neighborliness and friendship.302 The code of 
conduct was discussed among the participants. Although the completion of the draft was 
affected by the lack of consensus, the ministers had expressed their satisfaction that 
progress had been made in adopting the code to avoid armed clashes over territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea.303 The forum concluded by encouraging the further 
consultation between ASEAN and China to develop the code of conduct for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.304 
 
Through the review of China’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum from 1994 to 
2001, the conclusion can be reached that China showed its intention of dominating the 
discussions related to the South China Sea conflicts within the series of multilateral 
meetings. The format and pace of the security talks had been redirected in China’s favor. 
 
As it was mentioned earlier in this chapter, China’s concession of allowing the South 
China Sea talks in the formal multilateral forum was to maintain regional stability for 
national development. Meanwhile, the multilateral talks were used to help in establishing 
its regional order of “Sovereignty is mine, postpone disputes, exploit the resources for 
mutual benefit”.  
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Firstly, China’s ARF delegates never loosed their stance in defending their claims over 
the South China Sea areas. On the contrary, a series of actions during the 1990s had 
strengthened China’s claims in the region. The Mischief Reef incident in 1995 and 
further expansion of the structures in 1998 had provided China with a foot point deep 
inside the Spratlys. China’s new law on its maritime borders also provided a legalistic 
support to its claims on the region that heretofore had been based on historical grounds. 
China’s move, without doubt, raised concern among its weaker neighbors. However, 
China had been successful in appeasing them by using the ARF meetings. From China’s 
perspective, the situation in the South China Sea throughout the whole 1990s was stable. 
The conflicts between China and other claimants did not prevent the improvement of 
bilateral relations with respective countries, especially in economic terms.305  
 
Secondly, multilateral talks on the South China Sea disputes within the ARF bore the 
mark of Chinese needs and intents. China showed its reluctance of including security 
discussions in the ARF agenda. Although the security discussions of the South China Sea 
conflicts had been highlighted in the past ARF meetings, the leading role had been played 
by China, not ASEAN.306 One important reason was the disunity of ASEAN. Each 
ASEAN member had to strike a balance between its individual bilateral relationship with 
China and ASEAN solidarity on the South China Sea disputes.307 Under unremitting 
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pressure from China, a divergence of views on the disputes emerged within the group.308 
Consequently, the Philippines always felt betrayed by its ASEAN fellows within the 
forum as its initiatives could not get enough support from them. Another reason was the 
institutional weakness of the ARF. As ASEAN is the chairman of the forum, the norms 
mainly follow ASEAN’s practice that “decisions of the ARF shall be made through 
consensus after careful and extensive consultations among all participants”.309 This 
serves China’s interest in resolving the South China Sea conflicts. By opposing any 
adversarial initiative, the process of conflict resolution could move at a pace comfortable 
to China. Thus, Chinese Defense Minister lauded the ARF model by stating, “We 
appreciate and support the approach by most ARF countries in solving security issues 
through dialogue and consultation… We will continue our efforts as always”.310 It 
implied that China had been quite confident in talking with ASEAN countries at the 
multilateral forum. As ASEAN was afraid of confronting China on the South China Sea 
issues at the forum, China could easily silence any protest from the claimants.  
 
Thirdly, while opposing the security discussions in the multilateral forum, China was 
eager for cooperative projects with the South China Sea disputants. China had always 
expressed its stance of shelving the disputes while going for joint development pending a 
solution and hoped that its partners would gradually develop consensus among the forum 
members. In order to show its sincerity for cooperation, China was active in promoting 
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Confidence Building Measures in the region and had started to release the Defense White 
Paper since 1996 to promote military transparency. As the time was limited for the 
discussion of the South China Sea issues in the ARF agenda, little progress had been 
made on technical cooperation. Yet China’s proposal was acceptable to the other 
claimants and had been explored in the MPCSCS that was the regional informal 
multilateral mechanism. 
 
The last strategy was to forestall any attempt by the outsiders, especially the United 
States and Japan, to intervene in the South China Sea disputes. Unlike the MPCSCS, the 
ARF included not only regional claimants but also major global powers. The forum 
provided an opportunity for distant powers to express their concerns on the regional 
affairs. Any open discussion would probably induce the intervention from outsiders. As 
China’s concession of multilateral talk on the South China Sea conflicts was in a bit to 
gain the dominant role within the discussion group, any external influence would 
undermine China’s strategy.  
 
As such, China’s first step was to object to any political and security discussion on the 
South China Sea disputes in the ARF agenda. China’s delegates had grabbed every 
opportunity to express their stance that the ARF was not right place to talk about the 
South China Sea conflicts. However, initiatives were inevitably raised during the meeting 
when the regional tension was escalated. Then the second step was to assure the United 
States that China would respect the freedom of navigation in the region during the 
multilateral forum. As the sea lane for transportation of oil and gas was vital for the 
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United States and its allies. China’s promise to keep the regional peace and stability 
would prevent the U.S. direct intervention. The facts bear out the effectiveness of the 
strategy. 
 
China’ stance was clear and acceptable to most ASEAN members. They shared the angst 
that any involvement of non-regional actors would complicate the issue and the outside 
powers could use the involvement as the pretext for interfering in regional affairs. 
Fearing the intervention of the outsiders, the regional code of conduct in the South China 
Sea was finally signed between China and ASEAN at the end of the sixth China-ASEAN 
Summit (10+1), rather than the ARF, in November 2002. The declaration was considered 
the first political document concluded between China and ASEAN over the South China 
Sea issue. The two parties also reiterated their commitment to promoting a 21st-century 
oriented partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust, and to enhance cooperation 
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
        1.   CONCLUSION 
 
The dispute over sovereignty rights in the South China Sea remained a major security 
issue of mutual concern. ASEAN members, whatever their fears and hopes, felt there was 
no alternative but to engage China. Through the habit of dialogue in the multilateral 
setups since 1990, China had been gradually realizing that ASEAN was not a Western 
inspired grouping inimical to China’s interests. As China agreed to talk about the political 
and security issues within constructive multilateral mechanisms with the Southeast Asian 
disputants, the South China Sea issues had been explored in both regional informal 
workshop and international formal forum. 
 
The case studies fit well with Singh’s analysis about great power’s multilateral 
maneuvers in international organizations. According to Singh, a great power always 
grabs the dominant status  
1. By sowing the seeds of self-introspection and raising doubts about its own 
intrinsic worth and fundamental values on which it has been built up. This may be 
done with a view to replacing an existing agenda with a new one. 
2. By controlling who may or may not join its membership. 
3. By capturing its leadership or controlling those who are its leaders. 
4. By controlling the pace at which the given organization proceeds. 
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5. When all else fails, initiating parallel organization/s which serve the same 
function but are more pliable and subserve its interest more closely.312  
 
Although the creation of both the MPCSCS and the ARF was neither initiated nor 
preferred by China at the beginning, China has in the course of participation gradually 
redirected the multilateral discussions to its favored track. As China was not powerful 
enough, its behavior within the multilateral frameworks, to a large extent, was seen as 
trying to replace the existing agenda and to control the membership and the pace of 
process.  
 
In the case of the MPCSCS, any sovereignty and jurisdictional discussion about the 
territorial disputes had been set aside as per China’s request since the Fifth Workshop. 
While shelving the territorial dispute, the workshop redefined its focal point on 
promoting the technical cooperative projects for joint development. The pace for 
implementing the agreed proposal was also controlled by China. Besides, the issues of 
inviting non-South China Sea actors and formalizing the workshop were ignored in the 
meetings. By preventing distant powers from interfering in regional affairs, China could 
enjoy its “great power” status within the workshop. It was not difficult for China to 
oppose any adversarial initiative from the meeting. Only China’s preferred idea could be 
agreed as a consensus. By opposing the formalization, China could prevent Taiwan from 
gaining equal status with the other independent political entities. 
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Unlike the MPCSCS, the ARF was not a special forum for solving the South China Sea 
conflicts. The ARF agenda covered all the security issues in the entire Asia-Pacific area 
and involved most countries in the region. It was quite difficult for China to dominate the 
South China Sea discussion within the group. As such, China objected to any political 
and security discussion on the South China Sea dispute in the ARF agenda while 
expressing its sincerity for joint development in the disputed areas. China has been 
successful in consoling ASEAN nations and preventing any unified protest, in response 
to China’s unilateral actions, from them. In order to avoid any intervention from 
outsiders, especially the United States, China grabbed every opportunity to show its 
respect of the freedom of navigation in the region within the forum. So far, China has 
been quite successful in handling the South China Sea issues within the formal 
multilateral forum. 
 
China owes its multilateral success largely to its growing economic capabilities. China 
has maintained excellent economic ties with Southeast Asian nations for the purpose of 
strengthening its strategic, political and diplomatic influence in the region. China 
contributed more than US$ 4 billion to the affected countries during the East Asian 
Financial Crisis. Its promise of not devaluating the Yuan helped it win fame as a rock for 
regional stability. Otherwise, China’s bilateral trade with ASEAN grows dramatically. 
China has overtaken Japan as East Asia’s main regional export partner since 2003 and 
will replace the EU to become the region’s largest export market within the next few 
years.313 China has even emerged as a source of regional investment.314 
                                                 




Because they gained benefits through improved bilateral relations with China, ASEAN 
members were quite hesitant to support ASEAN solidarity on confronting China. In face 
of China’s unilateral actions in the region, ASEAN countries expressed their serious 
concerns. However, ASEAN, as a group, had always refrained from public articulation 
for fear of provoking China. Instead, they preferred “quiet diplomacy” with the purpose 
of convincing the Chinese to solve the territorial disputes without the use of force. It 
provided more room for China to practice its strategies in the multilateral mechanisms. 
 
Exploring the cases of the MPCSCS and the ARF does not imply that the South China 
Sea disputes are discussed only within these two multilateral mechanisms. Multilateral 
setups that touch this issue also include the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific (CSCAP), the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of ASEAN-China, Japan, South Korea 
(10+3), the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC) with 
ASEAN dialogue partners, ASEAN-China Dialogue Meeting (10+1) and so on. 
 
As China insisted that it would only negotiate with the claimants, it placed more 
emphasis on its multilateral discussions exclusively with ASEAN members. The first 
chance China talked with its ASEAN in a regional formal multilateral setup was in 1991. 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was invited by his Malaysian counterpart and the 
host to attend the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) as a guest. As it was the 
                                                                                                                                                 
314 China invests in Indonesia’s natural gas, in Malaysia’s palm oil, in Philippine infrastructure and in 
Singapore’s services sector. It also supports the building of a network of rail, highway and navigation links 
in the Mekong Delta. It has committed to support infrastructure building in the BIMP-EAGA (Brunei-
Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines Early Growth Area) region. See “Philippine Foreign Secretary Praises 
China Ties,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, October 22, 2005. 
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debut for China on formal Sino-ASEAN multilateral stage, ASEAN was afraid of 
discouraging China’s participation in the dialogue by talking about some sensitive issues. 
As a result, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea were not raised during the 
meeting. Meanwhile, China did not want the territorial disputes to be internationalized 
and was quite satisfied with ASEAN’s consideration. However, in the 25th AMM in 1992, 
Vietnam, as an observer, initiated the proposal to talk about the South China Sea issues. 
As a response, China reiterated its stance and kept the disputes silent in such a formal 
multilateral dialogue.  
 
The first formal multilateral talk on the South China Sea conflicts took place not at the 
Second ARF meeting but at the first ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in 
Hangzhou in April 1995. Tang Jiaxuan, China’s chief representative, initiated the talk on 
the South China Sea issue after the meeting. He reemphasized China’s “indisputable” 
claims in the region in the wake of the Mischief Reef incident while appeasing its 
ASEAN fellow members. The South China Sea issue later became an item on the agenda 
of the annual meetings at the third ASEAN-China (SOM) in Huangshan in April 1997.315 
The South China Sea issue was also discussed in ASEAN-China Dialogue Meeting and 
ASEAN-China Summit.  
 
China, however, reaffirmed that no discussion on territorial and sovereignty issues was 
allowed in the ASEAN-China meetings.316Although the ASEAN states have been able to 
form a consensus on the need to act collectively to press China to accept political and 
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security discussions in multilateral dialogues,317 the unity was not concrete as each 
member had its own interest in dealing with its relations with China. China’s stance was 
quite clear that it was interested in developing relations with ASEAN and would not 
allow the dispute to plague such development. Consequently, a statement was made 
between China and ASEAN agreeing “not to allow existing differences to hamper the 
development of friendly relations and cooperation”.318 Basing on this statement, China 
gradually steered the various ASEAN-China multilateral meetings to exclude the 
discussions on territorial and sovereignty disputes. Instead, it actively promoted technical 
cooperative projects within the ASEAN-China setups.  
 
As the ARF was the highest level of formal multilateral mechanism in the region, the 
purpose of making progress at the ASEAN-China multilateral meetings was essentially to 
help the ARF. However, China felt more comfortable talking about the South China Sea 
issues within various ASEAN-China meetings. Being aware of the intervention from the 
outsiders, the regional code of conduct in the South China Sea was finally signed 
between China and ASEAN at the end of the sixth ASEAN-China Summit (10+1), rather 
than the ARF, in November 2002. The declaration on conduct was considered the first 
time that China had accepted a multilateral agreement over the issues.319 As such, various 
ASEAN-China meetings are expected to contribute more for publicizing China’s regional 
orders in the foreseeable future. 
 
                                                 
317 Craig A. Snyder, “Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea,” 27. 
318 For details of the joint statement, see BBC Summary of World Broadcast, Part 3: Asia-Pacific, 
December 18, 1997. 
319 Leszek Buszynski, “ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol.25, No.3 (2003), 343. 
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While embracing the multilateral mechanisms in solving conflicts in the region, China 
still emphasized the importance of bilateral talks. From the realist point of view, 
negotiating through a bilateral means could help China maintain the size and power 
advantage it possesses. China, being a position of strength, essentially gets more room to 
negotiate within the bilateral talk. Meanwhile, given the multilateral nature of the most 
territorial disputes, it would be quite difficult to work out proposals agreed by all the 
claimants. Accordingly, the progress of taking any concrete action of joint exploration 
would be very slow. Taking the settlement of the Beibu Gulf (Tonkin Gulf) demarcation 
line between China and Vietnam as an example, China’s scholars agreed that bilateral 
talks, instead of multilateral talks, contribute more to solve the complicated territorial 
dispute.320  
 
Consequently, China has conducted bilateral consultations with the Southeast Asian 
claimants respectively. For instance, China and Vietnam have agreed to "high level" talks 
to discuss joint development in the South China Sea area and resolve their conflicting 
territorial claims.321 China’ bilateral relations with Malaysia also improved steadily. 
Malaysia preferred to see China as a friend and partner in pursuit of peace and prosperity 
for the region. In return, China rewarded Malaysia with friendly bilateral talks on the 
issues and assurances that China would never act physically against Malaysian forces.322 
Besides, China and the Philippines signed a joint statement on the maintenance of peace 
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and stability in the South China Sea. They agreed to promote a peaceful settlement of 
dispute through bilateral friendly consultations and negotiations. 323 
 
However, because of the multilateral nature of the territorial dispute, a bilateral approach 
would not be effective in achieving China’s desired outcome. On September 2, 2004, 
China and the Philippines signed the joint oil and gas research deal in Beijing. China 
commented that the agreement was the landmark for regional conflict resolution. It 
implied that China’s proposal of “joint development” could be accepted by the other 
territorial claimants. However, the proposal should be agreed by all the claimants because 
the territory dispute is essentially multilateral rather than bilateral. After the release of the 
news, Vietnamese government spokesman Le Dzung expressed deep concern on the 
agreement because the deal did not consult the other concerned parties.324  
 
Thus, multilateralism is considered necessarily “complementary” to China’s South China 
Sea policy.325 Thanks to the effort through both multilateral and bilateral means, the 
breakthrough for joint development in the disputed areas has been reached by the 
Philippines, China and Vietnam. Recognizing the prerequisite of maintaining their 
respective positions with regard to the South China Sea issue, the three countries signed 
the “Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area 
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in the South China Sea” in March 2005.326 Then the first joint project was launched in 
August by the respective national oil companies of the three countries.327 China’s 
President Hu expressed, “the Chinese side will continue to make joint efforts with the 
other two parties to ensure a successful exploitation of the South China Sea”.328 The 
implementation of the agreement would set a good model that other countries could 
follow, in terms of setting aside political dispute to work together in attaining peace, 
stability and development within the region. In the words of the Philippines President 
Gloria, the South China Sea region could unite rather than divide.329  
 
To sum up, China has been successful in taking unilateral actions for strengthening its 
regional presence while consoling Southeast Asian disputants through multilateral means. 
Besides, both bilateral and multilateral approaches have proved effective in publicizing 
China’s preferred order. China, once reluctant to multilateralism, began to realize the 
merits of participating in the multilateral frameworks. Unilateralism and bilateralism are 
the traditional means of China’s foreign policy towards the South China Sea conflicts. 
Since 1990, multilateralism has become the necessary complementarity. They serve the 
same ends of establishing the regional hegemonic stability. 
 
        2.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
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By reviewing China’s multilateral play in the region from 1990 to 2001, I can conclude 
that China was trying to publicize its norms in the multilateral talks with the purpose of 
building up its hegemonic stability in the South China Sea region. The resulting 
multilateral progress has been redirected under China’s favored terms. However, since 
the September 11th of 2001, the U.S. interests have been drawn back to the region due to 
terrorist concerns. The U.S. intention beneath the surface-level statement was quite 
suspected by the regional actors. Starting from a neo-realist standpoint, states in general 
aim “to maximize their relative power position over the other states”.330 Accordingly, it 
does not necessarily mean that the United States, as a status quo power, is benign or 
responsible, while China, willing to build up its hegemonic order in the region, is 
assertive or irresponsible. As such, ASEAN countries have come to a crossroads 
regarding how to react to a rising China. A number of policy implications follow directly 
from the analysis of China’s multilateral maneuver in solving the South China Sea 
conflicts.  
 
Assuming that China keeps rising, the possibility cannot be neglected that ASEAN could 
jump on the bandwagon with it. According to the multiple hierarchy model, regional 
power pursues the dominant status within its regional hierarchy. It can establish and 
maintain the regional order. However, the regional dominant state is subject to the global 
power’s intervention although the global power seldom interfere regional affairs. ASEAN 
had perceived China, together with the United States and Japan, as the major power in the 
region. There even exists a growing feeling within ASEAN that China will, in the next 20 
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years or so, seriously challenges, if not supplant, the U.S. dominance in the South China 
Sea area.331 In face of the growing giant, the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
expressed, “no nation would play a greater role than China in shaping the future of 
Asia”.332 The idea was echoed by ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino Jr who 
stated, “It is inevitable that China gains in strength economically and politically. The way 
ASEAN handles this is to form strong relationships with China. That's the only way to 
go”.333 A consensus has been reached by all neighboring countries that China has a great 
role to play in the future. They would have to learn how to relate to China on regional 
issues.  
 
As such, China’s proposal for solving the South China Sea conflicts in the multilateral 
mechanisms is expected to gain growing support from ASEAN countries. The “Tripartite 
Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South 
China Sea”, which owes much to the multilateral efforts, will be a promising act for 
“shelving territorial disputes while exploiting the resources jointly” in the region. As 
China preferred, the agreement will be helpful for creating a peaceful neighboring 
environment. Through the long-term mutual-benefited joint cooperation between the 
countries concerned, a possible move will be made by the Southeast Asian disputants that 
they may have to implicitly or explicitly recognize China’s claims. Consequently, the 
final end of “Sovereignty is mine, postpone disputes, exploit the resources for mutual 
benefit” can be reached. 
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If the South China Sea disputants and the other Southeast Asian countries finally choose 
to accept China’s regional rules and ally with China, this bandwagon act would herald the 
formation of regional hierarchy. China could enjoy being respected as the nominal owner 
of the South China Sea. In response, China will provide an agreement of joint 
exploitation of the South China Sea resources as the public goods to the secondary states. 
In addition, China will give a military support to keep the regional peace and prosperity. 
 
Once fully in control of the South China Sea, China can extend its military presence in 
the maritime heart of Southeast Asia that would throw a light on the future dominance 
over the region. The South China Sea could be a landmark for China’s breakthrough of 
the U.S. “crescent” containment system and serves as a strategic point in China’s “Pearl 
line”. It would provide an opportunity for China to access the Indian Ocean and the 
Pacific Ocean. 
 
However, other options still exist for ASEAN countries to choose regarding how to deal 
with a rising China. One is to join the U.S.-led group of containment. However, the main 
stream of ASEAN’s policy towards China during the late 20th century was engagement 
rather than containment. ASEAN preferred to talk about the South China Sea issues 
among the countries concerned. They were very cautious of inviting any outsider, even 
the United States, to the discussion table for fear of provoking China. Since the “911”, 
the United States has shown more interests in the region. Some ASEAN countries were 
glad to see the return of the U.S. military presence and competed offering base facilities 
to the United States. One of the reasons was to secure themselves from being bullied by 
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the rising China. However, it does not necessarily mean that ASEAN would join the U.S. 
containment. Because of the human rights issue and the East Asian Financial Crisis, 
ASEAN has realized that the United States was not that reliable.334 Taking part in the 
group may push themselves to the front line of anti-China camp. The regional multilateral 
talk will be considered by China as a function to restrain China and will undoubtedly lead 
to China’s withdrawal. The isolated powerful China will be more dangerous to its 
neighboring countries.  
 
Yet, a more possible alternative option for ASEAN is to play the balance of power in the 
region. During the Cold War period, ASEAN states did enjoy the U.S. protection. As 
ASEAN grew dramatically in economic terms, it began to aware its political power. In 
order to retain its greater freedom of action, ASEAN was asking for diluting its firm 
relation with the United States while diversifying its relations with the other regional 
powers. The rising China emerged as a possible choice. However, some ASEAN nations 
have expressed that they welcome closer ties with China but do not want to be 
exclusively dependent on it. They did not want to be forced to choose between China and 
the United States.335 From their perspective, the strategy of the balance of power would 
help to deny any hegemon the ability to assert undue dominance in the region. Initiating 
the South China Sea discussion within the ARF, which includes both China and the 
United States, could be considered as an attempt to balance China’s power through 
multilateral means. Being afraid of the U.S. global power, China had promised to assure 
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the freedom of navigation in the region. It might be regarded as the major outcome of the 
balance of power during the 1990s. However, such progress more likely owned to the 
multiple hierarchy rules between China and the United States than ASEAN’s multilateral 
efforts. China, striving for the regional leadership, showed its respect to the U.S. 
fundamental interest in the region. In return, the United States, as the global hegemon, 
tried to avoid being involved in the specific issue directly. The American military 
presence in Southeast Asia would not be considered as a threat to China. Although the 
U.S. strategy has been suspected by regional actors since the United States returned to the 
region for terrorist concerns,336 this paper assumes that the U.S. policy regarding the 
territorial disputes of the South China Sea remains consistently. Accordingly, ASEAN 
cannot achieve more favored results by playing with balance of power within the 
multilateral mechanism. 
 
No matter which policy will be chosen by ASEAN countries concerning the South China 
Sea disputes, it can be expected that China will maintain defending its territorial claims 
of the region. In addition, having been confident in the both informal and formal 
multilateral setups, China will continue considering multilateralism as the effective 
means to publicize its preferred order in the South China Sea area with the purpose of 
building up the regional hegemonic stability.  
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